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Old 04-14-2015, 11:22 AM   #11
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140 officers and 164 enlisted men were decorated; 163 Purple Hearts were awarded. A total of 3368 officers and 8781 enlisted men had been decorated. 137 awards were pending final action.
E. LOGISTICS
At the opening of the period logistical installations, trains and troops pertaining to supply were located as shown on Map B.

ORDNANCE
During the operation in the vicinity of BALDY ammunition supply functioned smoothly and all combat requirements were fulfilled.
ALL SERVICES
For the supply authorized and on hand see G4 periodic Logistical Reports,
Supporting Documents.

CHEMICAL
Each flame thrower located on the outpost line of resistance and the main line of resistance were serviced on an average of twice for each item.
There were twenty-six flame throwers and fifty-two service trips were made.
The main difficulty was lack of knowledge and lack of command supervision.
The majority of service trips were caused by low pressure in pressure tanks.
Instruction was given to personnel of using units and the necessity for command supervision stressed.

SURGEON
The problem of speedy evacuation of seriously wounded casualties to Mobile Army Surgical Hospital was solved by the use of a rail bus. This vehicle, with a capacity of thirteen litter patients was controlled by the Division Clearing Company.
Hospital trains began operation in the division sector in September.
One arrived every second day or as required.
The combination of rail-bus and hospital trains reduced ambulance service beyond the Division Clearing Station to a negligible amount.
TRANSPORTATION
A total of 208 railcars satisfied all division requirements for September.
The move of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry required twelve railroad coaches and fifty-seven 21/2 ton trucks. Support rendered the 1st ROK Division on 29-30 September required 104 21/2 ton trucks.
SIGNAL
The Signal Company devoted its time to winterization of communication wires. Wires were serviced and strung to reduce the loss of efficiency and possibility of the wires becoming buried by the anticipated snow.
WINTERIZATION
Under the supervision of the G4, personnel of the technical services inaugurated a winterization program in an attempt to forestall the problems ot the winter of 1951-52. A four day "winterization" school was conducted for officers and men representing subordinate units. A memorandum which consolidated all available information concerning preparation of equipment for cold weather operation and the medical aspects of cold weather was published and distributed to every unit in the division.
There were problems. The more important are discussed below.
ORDNANCE
Radiators have been critically short since the summer months. Those presently in use have been repeatedly repaired. At the close of the period the division required 700 radiators for 21/2 ton trucks. They were unavailable.
The winterization program was delayed by a lack of grease seals.
Winterization of vehicles required that G.A grease be used. This in turn necessitated an ample supply of grease seals. Only a limited supply of seals were available.
QUARTERMASTER
Winter clothing which had been renovated caused a serious problem. In anticipation of problems, General Fry ordered that units make every effort to issue correctly fitting winter clothing to their men, tag the clothing and properly store it until weather conditions made issue necessary.
The clothing was received in bundles which were marked with the size of the item it contained. A size was also marked on each item. It was found that these marked sizes were not correct. A division exchange program had to be inaugurated in an attempt to properly fit each soldier. By the close of the
period, however, neither winter underwear nor olive drab wool trousers could
be fitted to all men.
ENGINEER
The Division Engineer could not obtain lumber or sufficient nails.
These would have been used for con$truction of insulated bunkers and living quarters.
During August the Division Engineer requisitioned 2,000 pieces of lumber and the requisition was filled. In September 100,000 board feet were requisitioned and none was received.
During August 2,300 pounds of nails were requisitioned; 300 pounds were received. In September 7,000 pounds of the 14,000 pounds requisitioned were received.
Aside from the shortages concerning the winterization program there were other shortage problems.
The absence of vehicular spare parts caused the loss of manpower and maintenance effort. vitally required parts were necessarily obtained from vehicles being evacuated.
The shortage of replacement engines forM-39's necessitated conversion of C-4 engines.
SUPPLY
Attached is Periodic Logistics Report Number 473. The three other reports that constitute a four week period are included in the Supporting Documents.
Items in both critical and short supply are indicated according to service and class.
F. CHRONOLOGY
6 Sep: Prince Rang Apakrikon, Thailand Air Force Commodore visited the division.
8 Sep: Lt Gen Paul W. Kendall, I US Corps Commander attended French ceremony.
9 Sep: Maj Gen William E. Shambora, FECOM Surgeon; Col L. Holmes Ginn, EUSAK Surgeon; Col Clement F. St John, Chief, Plans and Operations, surgeon General's Office, Dept of the Army; Col Harold W Glattly, Chief of Personnel, surgeon General's Office, Dept of the Army, visited the division.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:22 AM   #12
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10 Sep: Following Congressmen visited the 2d Division: Rep C. Clark Fisher, (D, Texas); Rep Charles H. Elston, (R, Chio); Rep Carroll D· Kearns, (R, Penna); Rep Clyde Doyle, (D, Calif); Philip Kelleher, Armed Services Committee Counsel; Gen James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, EUSAK; and Lt Gen Paul W. Kendall, Commanding General, I US Corps.
13 Sep: Maj Gen Stephen N. Shoosmith, Deputy Chief of Staff, UN Command; Maj Gen Robert L. Dulaney, Commanding General, 3d US Infantry Division; Brig Gen John V. 'daters, Chief of Staff, I US Corps, visited the Indianhead Division.
18 Sep. Maurice DeJean, France Is ambassador to Japan; Capt. Vincent Maincent, military attache to French embassy, Tokyo, visited the division.
18 Sep: CCF troops capture BALDY·
18-21 : 23d Infantry relieves 9th Infantry on Line JAMESTOWN.
19 Sep: Gen James A. Van Fleet and Lt Gen Paul W. Kendall visited the 2d Division.
20-21 : 38th Infantry recaptures BALDY.
23 Sep: Col A. W. Stuart assumes command of 38th Infantry Regiment.
25 Sep: 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry departs for KIMPO PENINSULA.
30 Sep: 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry arrives CAMP CASEY.
G. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
COMMANDER'S EVALUATION
Engineer Bunkers
The use of prefabricated "Abe Lincoln" bunkers and the assault type bunker proved to be of great value to the infantry soldier.
The display of imagination, initiative and team spirit by members of the 2d Engineer combat Battalion when they conceived, developed and voluntarily produced these bunkers is typical of the spirit of 2d Division - Second To None!
THE BALDY OPERATION
The combination of intelligence estimate, terrain analysis, and knowledge and understanding of the political aspects of the Korean war foretold the enemy attack on BALDY.

Troops of an estimated enemy battalion were in Company K's trenches minutes after their preparatory fires lifted. This fact indicated that the Chinese were able to infiltrate a battalion through an area under our continuous observation and traversed by our patrols. The request from the Commanding Officer, Company K for artillery fires on his position was in accord with defensive doctrine. The repeated failure of communications is believed to be only partially due to enemy activity and worn equipment. It is believed that the major contributing factors were: (1) Officers and enlisted man had insufficient knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the radio sets they used, (2) there was a lack of well qualified radio operators and communication sergeants at rifle company level, (3) infantry battalions and companies failed to properly lay and service communication wire, and (4) commanders placed almost complete reliance upon wire communication.
The decision of the regimental commander to move Company E forward to occupy blocking positions was in accordance with defense doctrine. It is believed, however, that the platoon patrol sent forward from Company E should have been from a unit other than a company of the regimental reserve. On the night of 18 - 19 September the situation had been too vague to warrant a counter-attack. On the morning of the 19th, however, the only unknown elements were the strength and exact location of the enemy on the hill. Company K, as a unit, did not exist. The forward movement of the enemy had ceased. It was known that two platoons advancing simultaneously, each well supported by fire and each approaching the enemy from a different direction, had been forced to withdraw. It was known that the enemy had reserves with which he could reinforce the position and that he controlled a route over which they could move.
The decision to commit the reserve was proper. At the time this decision was made plans for intermediate attacks should have been cancelled.
Such cancellation would have permitted Company L to occupy its original position on the main line of resistance and would have eliminated much of the subsequent shuffling of units.
An evaluation of the final attack was made by General James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, EUSAK, who stated, "The recapture and subsequent consolidation of this key terrain feature against a determined Communist force supported by intense artillery and mortar fire, exemplified the spirit and resourcefulness of this command."
PORK CHOP
Company commander, Company B, 38th Infantry; the officer and men of the second platoon, Company B; and the men of the machine gun section, Company D were officially commended in a letter written by the commanding General, 2d Infantry Division for holding its ground on PORK CHOP with "grim determination and tenacity" on 18 September. The letter continued and stated "I can only say that although I expect such duty under these circumstances, nevertheless it is in accordance with the very finest and highest tradition or our service and of the "Second To None" Division."
DISCUSSION
GENERAL: The "Abe Lincoln" prefabricated bunker program was initiated by the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion on 21 July 1952. The purpose of this program was to provide a stout bunker that could be (1) mass produced for quantity production, (2) transported easily· to front line unloading points, (3) handled easily by carrying parties to the construction site, and (4) erected speedily by untrained personnel. The notched log design adopted provides a high degree of structural strength. Eight inch logs are used for the sides and roof; smaller logs are used for the bursting plate. Each side log is notched on both ends. Firing apertures are constructed according to infantry requirements. At present the apertures are approximately 14" x 36". The inside of the bunkers measure ten feet in width and eight feet in depth.
DISTRIBUTION: The logging site for the division is located 20 miles from the construction sit. Approximately 17 trucks are provided daily by the Division Quartermaster to transport the logs from the logging site. Each log is marked to indicate its position in the bunker. Each bunker is loaded on a quartermaster truck which delivers it to a front line battalion. Delivery is coordinated with the regimental supply officers.
PRODUCTION: Four hundred and ninety-eight bunkers have been prefabricated and delivered between the inception of the program, 21 July 1952
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:23 AM   #13
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and 1 October 1952.
DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED: The greatest difficulty encountered in the bunker production was the availability of logs. Existing stands of suitable trees were small and widespread. A secondary obstacle was that other engineer projects restricted the number of personnel available to operate the program. At first the effectiveness of the program was considerably lessened by misuse of the bunkers. Many of the logs were used for construction in battalion and regimental CP areas. It was found that units on the outposts were not inclined to carry the heavier logs up the hills but would take only the lighter logs designed for the top burster plate. Only by the concentrated
efforts of P and A platoons, AT and M platoons and the Engineers did the operation become effective.
ADVANTAGES: The prefabricated bunkers have proved to be superior to those of other construction. use of these bunkers automatically eliminates poor and often dangerous construction practices. once the logs are in the platoon area and the holes are dug, a rifle platoon can complete three (to include proper overhead cover) in one night. Of the 250 "Abe Lincoln" bunkers on position during the rainy season none collapsed. Approximately 375 of other design did.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the pertinent portions of the above discussion accompanied by diagrams be disseminated to all tactical commands. This will enable all to profit by the experience gained and lessons learned by the 2d Infantry Division - SECOND TO NONE!

J C. FRY
Major General U. S. Army Commanding
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:23 AM   #14
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The Aerial Recon Photographs.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:24 AM   #15
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A. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: One (1) Officer and thirteen (13) EM
B. TASK: To reconnoiter stream bed and to contact enemy and capture PSW
C. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 192100 Sep 52
D. TIME OF RETURN: 200200 Sep 52
E· ROUTE: From CT354382 followed river bank to CT346384 and cut due North over foot path past OF No 1 at CT345386. Went due Northwest to within twenty yards of the stream at CT343391 where patrol was ambushed by approximately two enemy squads.
F. TERRAIN: The path leading from OP No 1 is a gradual descent and ends in the vic CT344.388. The heavy growth of weeds (3 feet high), shell craters, and wet rice paddies makes walking very difficult in the valley to the North of the base of the hill at CT343388.
G. ENEMY: At CT342.393 the friendly forces were proceeding North when they were ambushed by an est two (2) enemy squads. The enemy opened fire on the six man recon group with burp guns, rifle fire, and hand grenades. The enemy concealed in a triangular group of bushes and after the recon group entered the triangle they opened fire. Just before the enemy fired the advance scout, who was approximately ten feet in front of the main group heard the enemy talking in the bushes ahead of him. While he was in the process of passing the information back to the platoon leader the enemy fired. In the brief encounter the asst plat leader who was second in line dropped to the ground and crawled east about twenty yards. He opened fire on the enemy positions, continued firing until his carbine jammed and then threw two grenades in the bushes where he had heard a loud scream. The fire coming from that direction stopped immediately and the assistant patrol leader heard a short cry of agony from the area where he threw the grenades. It is estimated that the enemy suffered one KIA and one WIA. The asst plat ldr then observed the enemy screening the area but he could not notice if the enemy picked up either the patrol leader or the advance scout who was later missing in action. The asst ptl ldr withdrew to the rallying point at GT345397, Half way back he found two wounded members of the recon group and called for aid for these men. Finally reaching the rallying point two other walking wounded were found and aid from the support group helped evacuate all the wounded. At 0300 a screening force was dispatched to screen the area but because of daylight they were forced to discontinue the search without finding any trace of the missing men.

K. RESULT OF ENCOUNTER WITH ENEMY: TWO friendly MIA, Six friendly WIA
one en est KIA, One en est WIA
L· CONDITION OF PATROL: Condition of patrol was excellent up until time of ambush when the entire group was demoralized with the loss of the patrol leader.
Attached Images
File Type: jpg 2nd Infantry Report September 1952 34.jpg (123.8 KB, 1 views)
File Type: jpg 2nd Infantry Report September 1952 35.jpg (29.5 KB, 1 views)
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:24 AM   #16
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1. Mission: To establish night ambush and capture PSW
2. Unit: Co G, 23d Infantry
3. Composition: one (1) rifle squad reinf with one (1) IMG and crew
4. Time of departures 212400 sep 52
5. Time of return: 220600 Sep 52
6. Route: See O/L. Objective CTJ13.36l
7. Debriefing: patrol from Co G consisting of one (1) rifle squad and one (1) LMG· Patrol crossed the 1D at 2400 hrs. The patrol used the regularly scheduled route. While proceeding along the route to the objective the patrol leader observed that the path he followed from either side by double apron barbed wire fence and at several places there were triangular tags hanging on the fence.
The patrol leader stated that the trail was too narrow for vehicular traffic but that the ground was fairly firm. At 0220 hrs the patrol was at CT317.360 which was about 100 yards short of the assigned objective. At this point and time the friend~ patrol was fired on by a group of enemy consisting of approximately eight (8) men from vicinity of CT.315.359. The friendly patrol withdrew after being fired on for approximately two (2) minutes. The friendly patrol did not return the fire but withdrew to vicinity CT.319360 and called in Artillery, mortar and small arms fire (from 1st plat Co G). Patrol leader again advanced on his original route with six (6) riflemen. When he started forward the patrol leader instructed his IMG crew and two (2) riflemen to remain at CT319.360 and cover his advance. The patrol leader accompanied by the six (6) men advanced to a point in the vicinity of CT312.360 arriving there at 0520 hrs. When the patrol leader reached this point the enemy again opened fire on the IMG that had remained in position in vicinity of CT.319360. The IMG returned the fire. The patrol leader and the six (6) men also opened fire on the enemy which at this time began withdrawing to the North. The patrol leader's group pursued the retreating enemy but lost sight of them in the darkness. The patrol advanced and attempted to regain contact but was unable to do so. By this time it was getting light so the patrol began their return to the MLR. The patrol closed in to the MLR at 0600 hrs.


A· SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: One NCO and 22 EM
B. TASK: To contact enemy, capture PSW and establish a five man OP for next day
C. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 271950 Sep 52
D. TIME OF RETURN: 282350 Sep 52
E. ROUTE: From CT351389 N along finger to small knoll at CT348394. At this point the advanced scout and patrol leader reconnoitered the flanks of the knoll. After they reported all clear the main body of the patrol advanced over the left slope being careful not to silhouette themselves along the skyline. They continued on to CT348395 where the support group was set up in a tight perimeter overlooking the objective at CT34B399. The ten man recon group continued on to within 50 yards of the commo trench at CT347397. This group found a small skirmish line and the patrol leader and three other men advanced to within five yds of the commo trench when the patrol leader initiated the action. The patrol returned by same route using the leap frog method.
F. TERRAIN: The trail through the mined areas to the direct front of Love OP No 2 was still muddy and slippery from the preceding days rain. The knoll at CT348394 was also muddy in spots and the descent dawn the N slopes was very difficult over the loose rocks along the path.
G. ENEMY: At 2115 the advanced scout group of our men saw approximately 10 helmets protruding up over the edge of the commo trench at CT348397. The group crawled within five yds of the enemy where the patrol leader led the men in the initial assault on the enemy. The friendly troops opened fire with carbines, one BAR, and one .45 cal pistol. The enemy, stunned by the aggressiveness, waited almost a minute before they retaliated with S/A, HG, and MG fire. The four men hit the ground and took cover in a couple of small shell craters. From this position they threw a total of 32 HG which blasted and routed the enemy from their positions. As the enemy withdrew they wildly threw grenades at the friendly forces. The majority of these landed over the heads of the scout group and exploded harmlessly in the vacant area between the recon and the scout party. Only two grenades landed close to the advance party but one of those was a dud and the other which bounced off the patrol leaders leg and rolled directly beside the asst scout did not have the pin pulled. At this time the group tried to approach the commo trench to pick up a PW but a MG opened fire from the vic of a bunker on the extreme right flank of the knoll and the friendly maneuvered back to gain additional fire support from the rest of the patrol. After joining the recon and the support group, which had pulled up to give assistance they called for Artillery fire and fixed bayonets for an attack on the enemy. While they continued firing the enemy was heard to be shouting commands in the Korean language. one command was given for "the first platoon to move out to the left to outflank the friendly forces" Another shouted that "It's Americans, start firing", and followed by some sort of command for the second platoon. Upon the short blast of a bugle the friendly artillery and mortar fire covered the knoll and the enemy once again, retreated northward. It is believed that the enemy was caught in the process of bringing up reinforcements and was regrouping for an attack. After this no signs of enemy activity were observed except for men running back over the ridge line towards Pig Dagmar CT346410. These en were also believed to be caught in a steady stream of Quad .50 and tank fire on the path CT347406 leading up towards the saddle between the twin peaks of Big Dagmar. En mortar and direct fire 76 mm mountain guns started falling around the patrol. Friendly ammo and HG's being very short, orders to disengage were given and the patrol leap frogged back to Love Co HLR. All the way back enemy 105 mm (est) artillery pursued the friendly element.
K. RESULT OF ENCOUNTER WITH ENEMY: seven (7) enemy counted KIA; Fifteen estimated WIA; undetermined number of enemy casualties from friendly artillery, mortar, quad .so, and tank fire. one friendly KIA (MG fire); one friendly WIA (shell fragment)
L. CONDITION OF PATROL: Excellent
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:25 AM   #17
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Digging deeper brings the Regimental Report for September 1952.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:25 AM   #18
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INTRODUCTION
During the period 17 Aug thru 20 Aug 52, the 38th Infantry Regiment relieved the 23rd Infantry Regiment in the assigned sector of LINE JAMESTOWN. No significant operations were under taken. The last week brought intense rains and extensive damage to defensive positions. The period closed with all elements of the 38th Infantry giving maximum effort to reconstruction of installations and road nets.

Unit location and commanding officers of the Regiment at the beginning of the period were as follows:

38th Vic CT289306 Lt-Col William F. Kernan
1st Bn Vic CT309281 Maj Jack A. Dunlap
2nd Bn Vic CT301322 Maj Henry Greer
3rd Bn Vic CT275299 Lt-Col George C. Fogle
ND Bn Vic CT286321 Lt Col Cornelis Schilperoord

NARRATIVE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS
Tactical operations for the period 1 Sept to 17 Sept consisted of an active defense and improvement of LINE JAMESTOWN. The Regiment continued reconstruction of damage done during the heavy rains of late August. On 5 Sept the 1st Bn which had been in the reserve positions commenced relief of the Netherlands Detachment in the center of the regimental sector. At 0516451 Sept the 1st Bn assumed responsibility for the sector. The Netherlands Bn closed
reserve positions Vic 309202 at 0616451 Sept 52 and commenced a seven day training program.
The regiment dispatched combat, reconaissance, ambush, patrols, and listening posts each night to provide information, early warning, and to capture enemy PsW. On the night of 12-13 Sept 52 "C" Co patrol with Regt I & R attached engaged UNE in intermittent fire fights from 2030 hours to 0035 hours. Vic CT2718356 and CT283355. The enemy suffered Est 4 WIA and 12 counted KIA. On the same evening two other patrols made contact with the enemy in short fire fights. Estimate an additional 20 enemy casualties from these two actions.
On 17 Sept the Netherlands Detachment assumed responsibility fir the right sector of the regiment. The 2d Bn moved into the regimental reserve positions and prepared to conduct a seven day training program.
On 1819001 Sept the enemy launched a coordinated attack on outposts Baldy and Pork Chop. Pork Chop was attacked by an estimated En Co; Baldy an Est En Bn (-).
B Co of the 38th held Pork Chop with a reinforced platoon. The enemy attacked at dusk moving in with his own Arty. The En overran the positions but were driven off. The fire fight continued until 2330 Hrs. The 1st Bn reinforced the platoon of B Co with the 1st Bn Raider Platoon immediately following the fire fight. This action accounted for 60 En KIA counted, 120 En WIA Est.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:26 AM   #19
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Simultaneously with the attack on Pork Chop the En attacked OP "Baldy". Making advantage of friendly smoke used to screen the road to the left company's position the En was able to move in close to the OP. The En moved in with his own Arty, an .Est 1000 rounds, and overran K company's Psns on the crest of the hill. The action continued throughout the night, with the 3rd Bn holding fast to the left slope of the hill. Elements of L Co moved up the hill to ascertain the situation on Baldy, crossing the line of departure at 2200 Hrs. E Co moved into blocking Psn Vic CT266321, assuming responsibility for the Psn 1823451 Sept 52. At 1906551 Sept 52 the Elms of L Co dispatched to determine the situation on the crest was forced to W/D due to intense En fire. During the following day C/Atks by the 38th Inf failed to regain the crest. At 2005301 Sept 52 a patrol from I Co reached the 5th bunker of the left slope and stayed in those positions until the hill was retaken the following morning.
During the next two days several reliefs were made in the blocking Psn and left company positions of the 3rd Bn. E Co was relieved in the blocking Psn by C Co of the 2d Eng and returned to previously Reptd Res Psns. G Co Reld L Co in assigned sector at 1908001 Sept 52 and was in turn relieved by the 2d Reconnaisance Co at 1921001 Oct 52.
The morning immediately following the En attack on "Old Baldly" intense Arty and air power was directed at all known enemy installations in the immediate vicinity of the affected point. 18 air strikes were directed at lucrative targets with excellent results. The pressure on the enemy from air bombardment was kept up throughout the night with radar directed MPQ-2 bombings close in.
All day the 20th continued air strikes were placed repeatedly on close in enemy strong points, 10 air strikes were conducted on that day, along with MPQ-2 bombings during the night.
At 2005301 Sept 52 a patrol from Item Co reached the 5th bunker on the right slope of Baldy. The patrol remained in the positions until the subsequent C/Atks that evening.
On the morning of 19 Sep 52 the commanding officer of the 2d Bn was notified that his Bn was to conduct a Bn size C/Atk on "Old Baldy". thorough reconnaisance and planning was undertaken by the Bn commander and staff.


Due to the nature of the terrain the only possible method of attack which would allow the Bn to make maximum use of its striking force was a double envelopment coming up the right and left fingers of the hill. One company was to attack up the left finger, and one company up the right finger with the third company in reserve. With the method and direction of the attack dictated by the formation of the ground the remaining decisions to be made were: (a) Should the attack be launched during the day or night and in either event at what time. (b) Should the attack have a heavy Arty preparation or should it be made with none.
The advantages of the day attack over the night attack was that as thorough a reconnaisance would not be necessary. Control during the attack would greatly be increased. The greater advantages rested with the night attack, the attacking elements could move under the cover of darkness and gain surprise. The attacking elements when joined could consolidate the ground, and any large coordinated enemy counterattack would have to come during the daylight hours or after dark the next evening. In either case we would be gaining time or force the enemy to attack during daylight hours. It was because of the latter that the night attack was decided upon. I Corps rendered the decision as to the time of the attack to coordinate with an attack on Kelly Hill in the adjacent division sector. Recent experiences by this regiment have indicated that when an Arty preparation is used the Chinese are prepared for the attack which follows and there is no element of surprise. The area has been thoroughly saturated with air strikes, night bombings, and heavy Arty fires continually after the initial attack on Baldy. Three tanks were sent up the hill early on the day preceding the attack and fired the entire day at enemy positions. The decision was made to attack without a preparation in as much as the enemy had been continually pounded since they had. gained thee hill, and had not had the opportunity to build up the defensive positions to any great extent.
The necessary reconnaisance by Bn and Co officers was made on the 19th and 20th of Sep 52. At 2020451 Sep 52 G and F Cos crossed their respective LODs, G Co on the left flank and F Co on the right, moving forward slowly. At 2230 Hrs F Co was pinned down by heavy En fire, E Co moved forward. At 2247 Hrs to reinforce F Co. G, F and E Cos moved slowly up the hill reaching the crest of Baldy at 2106201 Sep 52 and secured the hill.

The 2d Bn immediately began the task of reorganizing and consolidating the position. Supplies and reinforcements were brought up throughout the day. The Bn organized the hill as a separate strong point, overhead cover on fighting positions were constructed as quickly as possible with what material was available.
After Baldy was secured a concerted effort on the part of the 38th Infantry Regiment, the 2d Engineers, and other support elements of the division was directed at making "Old Baldy" a fortress. Maximum effort was given to "Baldy" with considerable effort directed at outposts Erie, Arsenal and Pork Chop. The 2d Engineers began construction of a road for wheeled vehicles to Baldy to replace the existing road which could be used by personnel carriers only. The Engineers also began work on a wheeled vehicle road to Erie, a road previously passible to personnel carriers only.
At 2115301 Sept the 2d BN of the 9th Inf began the relief of the 1st Bn in the center sector of the Regiment. The plan being to have the 1st Bn which had not sustained heavy casualties, relieve the 3rd Bn in the left sector. The 2nd BN of the 9th assumed responsibility for the center sector on 2117301 Sept and passed to Opn control of the 38th Inf.
Col A W Stuart assumed command of the 38th Inf Regiment on 2308301 Sept 52.
On 27 Sep the 2d Bn of the 38th Infantry relieved the 2d Bn of the 9th Inf in the center sector of the regiment. The 2nd Bn of the 38th Inf assumed responsibility for the sector at 2709001 Sep and the relief was completed by 2711091 Sep.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:27 AM   #20
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During the month of Sep the 38th continued an active defense of its assigned sector of LINE JAMESTOWN, sustaining two heavy En attack on major outposts. On 18 Sep the En launched a coordinated attack on two of the regimental combat outposts. The major En effort was directed toward the outpost on Hill 266, more commonly known as "Baldy". A secondary effort assumed to be a diversion was made on combat out post "Pork Chop" at the same time. The 38th Inf retained control of Pork Chop and regained control of "Baldy" with a coordinated Bn attack conducted by the 2d Bn. On 20 Sep. The remainder of the month was devoted to conducting extensive refortification of "Old Baldy" with the other combat out posts. Work plans, progress reports and a master work plan for the Regt front was developed to guide the construction. The period closed with the 38th Infantry in complete control of all previously reported defensive positions.
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