08-02-2002, 03:47 PM
Christian,
First off, your citations for Vasilievsky have already been addressed and in some cases countered, yet you do not make any rebuttal. You claim support for Vasilevski based on operational planning and battlefield exploits, but then say that others should only consider operational planning.
Moscow cannot be called a 50% victroy as the victory was the survival of the USSR to fight on and not surrender in the winter of 1941. Their overextended winter campaign can be blamed on Stalin being to ambitious and believing that he could destroy all of Army Group Center when it was not possible given Soviet resources. Once again, without the USSR's survival Stalingrad doesn't happen.
I do not see your point about Mars. It was a defeat but as I mentioned before, a defeat doesn't mean that a leader is not a strategic genius. Napolean was defeated but he was one of the greatest strategic geniuses of all time. Your coralation between the defeat at Mars and an Allied defeat at Normandy is not relivant. Its comparing apples to oranges. Both the size differences in the Fronts, manpower involved, geographic considerations and type of assault involved render your comparision pointless. If I follow your logic, I could make the point that if the Allies had suffered the 3,000,000 KIA/MIA that the Soviets suffered in 1941, we would have had a difficult time winning the war and might not have participated. Its a pointless argument that does not bolster your case.
The "disaster at Seelow Heights" was as much a fault of Stalin's political pressure to capture Berlin by 1 May then anything else. There could be no deviation from a frontal assault on the Heigths. Zhukov's use of searchlights was a tactical error, but certainly was not a strategic error. He did commit his Tank Armies too early but once again this was under the direct pressure of Stalin and is a tactical not a strategic problem. As for causalties, the Soviets never cared about them. Only victory was important.
As for Vasilevskii, his operation in Mongolia was not proof of a "Strategic greatness" in that the war was over before the USSR joined and had little strategic value toward the ending of W.W.II. The Japanese Army in China could not support Japan against an American invasion as no shipping was available to transport them. Stalin joined the war only in an effort to grab more land. Now it was strategic in setting up the military-political situation in the Far East for the Cold War. And the operation was briliant in its use of logistics and maneuver. Its one of the greateat ever.
Your personal attacks and attempts at showing name calling are laughable and beyond comment.
In our ealier emails, I still didn't find a serious quotation that meant anything. Since we are in a public forum, please post them here for all to see and read.
The only person not speaking the truth is you Christian. You continue to misrepresent, spin and tarnish others in a never ending assult on others.
Just my opinion,
Ed
First off, your citations for Vasilievsky have already been addressed and in some cases countered, yet you do not make any rebuttal. You claim support for Vasilevski based on operational planning and battlefield exploits, but then say that others should only consider operational planning.
Moscow cannot be called a 50% victroy as the victory was the survival of the USSR to fight on and not surrender in the winter of 1941. Their overextended winter campaign can be blamed on Stalin being to ambitious and believing that he could destroy all of Army Group Center when it was not possible given Soviet resources. Once again, without the USSR's survival Stalingrad doesn't happen.
I do not see your point about Mars. It was a defeat but as I mentioned before, a defeat doesn't mean that a leader is not a strategic genius. Napolean was defeated but he was one of the greatest strategic geniuses of all time. Your coralation between the defeat at Mars and an Allied defeat at Normandy is not relivant. Its comparing apples to oranges. Both the size differences in the Fronts, manpower involved, geographic considerations and type of assault involved render your comparision pointless. If I follow your logic, I could make the point that if the Allies had suffered the 3,000,000 KIA/MIA that the Soviets suffered in 1941, we would have had a difficult time winning the war and might not have participated. Its a pointless argument that does not bolster your case.
The "disaster at Seelow Heights" was as much a fault of Stalin's political pressure to capture Berlin by 1 May then anything else. There could be no deviation from a frontal assault on the Heigths. Zhukov's use of searchlights was a tactical error, but certainly was not a strategic error. He did commit his Tank Armies too early but once again this was under the direct pressure of Stalin and is a tactical not a strategic problem. As for causalties, the Soviets never cared about them. Only victory was important.
As for Vasilevskii, his operation in Mongolia was not proof of a "Strategic greatness" in that the war was over before the USSR joined and had little strategic value toward the ending of W.W.II. The Japanese Army in China could not support Japan against an American invasion as no shipping was available to transport them. Stalin joined the war only in an effort to grab more land. Now it was strategic in setting up the military-political situation in the Far East for the Cold War. And the operation was briliant in its use of logistics and maneuver. Its one of the greateat ever.
Your personal attacks and attempts at showing name calling are laughable and beyond comment.
In our ealier emails, I still didn't find a serious quotation that meant anything. Since we are in a public forum, please post them here for all to see and read.
The only person not speaking the truth is you Christian. You continue to misrepresent, spin and tarnish others in a never ending assult on others.
Just my opinion,
Ed
