08-02-2002, 07:28 PM
Since I have asked others to support there case with examples, I will try to do so here. While I do not believe that Zhukov was a perfect commander, I do think that he merits votes. While he did not win every battle (Glantz's book, "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat" points that out) this does not disqualify him either. Here are some quotations about Zhukov and his role in the war from various historical works:
On Zhukov's importance at Leningrad,
"Zhukov, the toughest troubleshooter in the Red Army, the man who had been Chief of Staff at the war's outbreak, who had been thrown in at Yelnya on the Western Front when the going got rough and who was now facing the most difficult assignment in his career...." p. 320. Harrison Salisbury, "The 900 Days: The Seige of Leningrad." Harper and Row, 1969.
"Stalin (speaking to Zhukov) received the report siently (that the Germans had backed off from Leningrad), then, after a puase, said that the Moscow situation was serious, particularly on the Western Front.
'Turn your command over to your deputy and come to Moscow,' Stalin ordered." p. 351, Harrison Salisabury, "The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad."
On why Zhukov's role was deminished at wars end:
"Stalin's decision to assume direct control was obviously intended to enhance his postwar prestige and reduce that of his most prominant wartime marshals, especially Zhukov." p. 237, David Glantz & Jonathan House, "When Titans Clashed; How the Red Army Stopped Hitler." University of Kansas Press, 1995.
On Vasilevsky importance to Stalin at the same time (Oct. 1944):
"Vasilevsky, in fact, was relegated to the largely nominal role of Stavka coordinator for the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts on the northern flank." p. 238, Glantz, "When Titans Clashed."
On the duel role played by Zhukov and Vasilivsky in Planning Operation Uranus:
"The long series of strategic and operational failures - produced in part by Stalin's reliance on his own military intuition and that of numerous political cronies instead of the sound advise of his military experts, such as G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky - finally persuaded Stalin to trust the professional military ..." p. 129, Glantz, "When Titans Clashed."
On blaming Zhukov for the failure of the winter offensive in 1941-42 and calling Moscow a 50% victory:
"Zhukov and other commanders opposed the general offensive on the grounds that it would dissipate available forces over too wide a frontage." p. 91. Glantz, "When Titans Clashed."
On Zhukov's role in strategic victory at Moscow and importance to final victory:
"Events occured in the period from July to September 1941 which forever changed the course of the war. Instead of triumphs, the German Army experienced a series of delays and reversals culminating in a strategic defeat at the hands of Georgii Zhukov at the very gates of Moscow in December 1941." p. xi, Bryan Fugate & Lev Dvoretsky, "Thunder on the Dnepr: Zhukov - Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkreig." Presidio Press, 1997.
"The strategy and tactics used at Yelnia by the Russians were honed and fine-tuned by Zhukov until he perfected them on an enormous scale around Moscow in December." p. xiv, Fugate, "Thunder on the Dnepr."
"..the defeat of Barbarossa was much more due to the strategic vision of two remarkable men, Zhukov and Timoshenko. Without them, unquestionably, the war would have had a much different ending." p. xiv, Fugate, "Thunder on the Dnepr."
I wish I could find more quotations but I found these in about 15 minutes of looking. I also noted that Glantz was a strong supporter of Zhukov despite assurtions that he was not. Even in his book "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat" the theme is not that Zhukov was a failure, but that Zhukov made mistakes and was hard-headed.
I hope that this backs up my argument to some degree.
Just my opinion,
Ed
On Zhukov's importance at Leningrad,
"Zhukov, the toughest troubleshooter in the Red Army, the man who had been Chief of Staff at the war's outbreak, who had been thrown in at Yelnya on the Western Front when the going got rough and who was now facing the most difficult assignment in his career...." p. 320. Harrison Salisbury, "The 900 Days: The Seige of Leningrad." Harper and Row, 1969.
"Stalin (speaking to Zhukov) received the report siently (that the Germans had backed off from Leningrad), then, after a puase, said that the Moscow situation was serious, particularly on the Western Front.
'Turn your command over to your deputy and come to Moscow,' Stalin ordered." p. 351, Harrison Salisabury, "The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad."
On why Zhukov's role was deminished at wars end:
"Stalin's decision to assume direct control was obviously intended to enhance his postwar prestige and reduce that of his most prominant wartime marshals, especially Zhukov." p. 237, David Glantz & Jonathan House, "When Titans Clashed; How the Red Army Stopped Hitler." University of Kansas Press, 1995.
On Vasilevsky importance to Stalin at the same time (Oct. 1944):
"Vasilevsky, in fact, was relegated to the largely nominal role of Stavka coordinator for the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts on the northern flank." p. 238, Glantz, "When Titans Clashed."
On the duel role played by Zhukov and Vasilivsky in Planning Operation Uranus:
"The long series of strategic and operational failures - produced in part by Stalin's reliance on his own military intuition and that of numerous political cronies instead of the sound advise of his military experts, such as G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky - finally persuaded Stalin to trust the professional military ..." p. 129, Glantz, "When Titans Clashed."
On blaming Zhukov for the failure of the winter offensive in 1941-42 and calling Moscow a 50% victory:
"Zhukov and other commanders opposed the general offensive on the grounds that it would dissipate available forces over too wide a frontage." p. 91. Glantz, "When Titans Clashed."
On Zhukov's role in strategic victory at Moscow and importance to final victory:
"Events occured in the period from July to September 1941 which forever changed the course of the war. Instead of triumphs, the German Army experienced a series of delays and reversals culminating in a strategic defeat at the hands of Georgii Zhukov at the very gates of Moscow in December 1941." p. xi, Bryan Fugate & Lev Dvoretsky, "Thunder on the Dnepr: Zhukov - Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkreig." Presidio Press, 1997.
"The strategy and tactics used at Yelnia by the Russians were honed and fine-tuned by Zhukov until he perfected them on an enormous scale around Moscow in December." p. xiv, Fugate, "Thunder on the Dnepr."
"..the defeat of Barbarossa was much more due to the strategic vision of two remarkable men, Zhukov and Timoshenko. Without them, unquestionably, the war would have had a much different ending." p. xiv, Fugate, "Thunder on the Dnepr."
I wish I could find more quotations but I found these in about 15 minutes of looking. I also noted that Glantz was a strong supporter of Zhukov despite assurtions that he was not. Even in his book "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat" the theme is not that Zhukov was a failure, but that Zhukov made mistakes and was hard-headed.
I hope that this backs up my argument to some degree.
Just my opinion,
Ed
