A Fully Researched Award For Heroic Combat In North Korea.

[CtahhR]

C. INTELLIGENCE

HEADQUARTERS
38th Infantry Regiment
APO 248
S-2 Evaluation
September 1952

October 4, 1952

1. a. During the period 1-30 September 1952 the regiment occupied positions on line Jamestown.
b. the enemy to the front of the regiment displayed a much more aggressive attitude than was noted in the previous period reported on. Friendly patrols contacted enemy elements at points previously traveled by our patrols without interference. In a few instances he showed disregard for our retalliatory fires, which were limited by available supply rate, by employment of tanks and recoiless rifles in direct fire on friendly positions. The enemy displayed his ability to attack, without warning, under a heavy concentration of supporting artillery,by execution of simultaneous attacks on outposts "Baldy" (CT256323) and Porkchop (CT268337), both of which were successful from the point of view that the enemy was able to reach friendly positions. There two actions are discussed below.

2. a. Baldy Action. On 17 September two enemy tanks and an unknown number of recoiless rifles brought direct fire to bear on positions on "Baldy" (CT256323). This was the first time such action by the enemy was reported in that particular sector. On the following day, the enemy delivered a very large volume of accurate fire throughout daylight hours, covering "Baldy" with at least 1000 rounds. Previous intercepts of enemy radio traffic had mentioned enemy offensive action was to take place on 18 September. This warning, plus the much heavier than normal incoming artillery and direct fire mentioned above, were strong indications of an enemy attack forthcoming and all troops were alerted. At 1850 hours a very intense enemy artillery, mortar, tank fire, and recoiless rifle fire preparation fell on outpost "Baldy" (CT256323), outpost Porkchop (CT268337), and on friendly MLR positions, with a large amount of harassing fire coming in on rear areas. By 1900 hours elemennts of an enemy infantry battalion succeeded in gaining positions on "Baldy", having moved in with an attack towards the center positions and an enveloping force around the east flank.
Although heavy friendly artillery and Cal 50 machine gun fire was immediately called in on friendly positions and although small groups of friendly infantry remained in control of some portions of the hill, the enemy succeeded in his attack and had actual over-all control of the hill. Furthermore, the enemy established a platoon sized ambush on a likely avenue of movement of friendly reinforcements and succeeded in preventing a friendly company from reinforcing during the night of 18-19 September.

Counter attacks by friendly elements during daylight hours of 19 September maintained pressure on the enemy but were driven back by heavy and accurate enemy artillery and mortar. Pressure on the enemy was also placed by friendly tanks, artillery and air,l denying the enemy the opportunity to properly organize the position.
On the night of 20 September a friendly counter attack, moving very aggressively, drove the enemy from "Baldy" in complete confusion. Retreating enemy elements were caught in the open with very heavy VT fire from friendly artillery.
b. It is believed that in spite of the warnings of impending enemy attack, the enemy achieved complete surprise in the initial phase of this action by the following means:
(1) Timing of the attack. Previously the enemy had customarily attacked during complete darkness, usually around midnight. His attack during daylight was a complete departure from past experiences and undoubtdly caught friendly troops at a time when preparations were not completely made for expected action.
(2) The closeness of enemy troops to their own artillery preparation. The enemy infantry was on friendly psotions 10 minutes after the preparation began and before the preparation had completely lifted. Since no unusual sighting had been noted during the day, it is apparent that the enemy successfully infiltrated a battalion sized force to an area 10 minutes marching distance from "Baldy" and assembled and concealed it there.
(3) Intensity of artillery preparation. Friendly troops, although they had received heavy incoming artillery during the day, were not prepared, by experience, for the terrific preparation just prior to the attack.

c. (1) It is believed that the enemy's mission was to attack and hold "Baldy". Indications which point out that intention were numerous. The enemy dead found on the hill were generally equipped with various types of bags containing rations and large amounts of ammunition. At least 60 cases of grenades were brought up by the enemy and put on positions. Many cave type emplacements were found that had been dug by the enemy in his attempts to organize the position. Two flags were found, which has been prepared by enemy units dedicating those units to the siezure of the hill.
(2) The enemy's failure to accomplish the mission of holding "Baldy" was probably due to the constant pressure placed on his troops by friendly air strikes, artillery, tanks, and infantry counter-attacks. It is believed that he suffered approximately 500 casualties during the entire operation and was never able to effectively organize a defense.

3. a. Porkchop Action. At precisely the same time as the artillery preparation and infantry attack took place on "Baldy" similar enemy action was taking place on outpost "Porkchop" (CT268337). The enemy attacked from the north and from the west flank, closely following their artillery preparation as in the "Baldy" action. Enemy infantry reached friendly positions, moved through them and back, assaulted once more to pick up their wounded, and withdrew.
The enemy achieved surprise in much the same manner as noted in the "Baldy" action.
b. It is believed that the enemy's attack on this hill was a diversion to the main effort being made on "Baldy". The indications bearing out such enemy intentions were (1) The enemy could probably have occupied the outpost had he so desired, since most of the friendly troops on the hill were casualties.
(2) A very definite withdrawal, along with attempts to secure his wounded,was made, seemingly according to plan. (3) "Porkchop" could very easily be made untenable to enemy by virtue of friendly dominating observation of the outpost.
4. Aggressive friendly patrolling resulted in 13 patrol contacts, verifying enemy presence at the points of contact and his intentions of resisting efforts to drive him from positions he now occupies. Meeting engagements with enemy patrols in unoccupied terrain showed a marked increase indicating more aggressive patrol activity on the part of the enemy.

5. The enemy only initiated contact, in addition to the two outpost actions noted above, occurred when a small raiding party succeeded in infiltrating to friendly positions on "Baldy". This group entered the communication trenches and succeeded in capturing 1 Katusa soldier before being detected. It is probable that this manuever was executed by a specialized reconnaisance unit whose sole mission is to capture prisoners.
6. Two CCF prisoners, both wounded, were captured by friendly troops during the period, but died of wounds before interrogation was possible.
7. The enemy to the front of the regiment consists of: 39th CCF Army, 1st Bn, 345th Regiment, 115th Division deployed between the CT23__26 grid lines. 38th CCF Army, 1st and 3rd Bn, 337th Regt, 113th Division deployed between the CT26-32 grid lines. The enemy occupies OPLR positions from east to west in our sector on "T-Bone" (CT295358), "Pokkae (CT276349), "Hasakkol" (CT264348) "Hill 228" (CT252325), and "Hill 222" (CT243319).
8. Artillery and mortar fire received has varied from very heavy to very light, with the general pattern throughout the period of a build up to the time of the "Baldy" action, with a very marked decrease since that time.
9. The enemy remains capable of:
(a) Continuing in active defense with units now in contact.
(b) Launching limited objective attacks with units now in contact.
© Reinforcing "a" or "b" with reserves consisting of 22 battalions.
(d) To launch all out attack with units now in contact and 22 additional battalions carried in reserve.

Walter H Root
Capt Inf
S-2