04-14-2015, 04:28 PM
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION
During this period the Regiment continued its occupation of the LINE JAMESTOWN.
For the period 1-18 September 1952 the emphasis was on improvement and rehabilitation of existing fighting positions. Bunkers were rebuilt, communication trenches deepened, and protective wire laid. All of this work was done under a steady increasing tempo of enemy mortar fire. This action reached a climax on 18 September 1952 when Pork Chop and Baldy received tremendous all day pounding by mortar and artillery to which was added direct fire artillery. This fire severely damaged these positions' bunkers that had previously been considered sound.
Just before dark the fire increased on these positions and the enemy began harrassing fire on the MSR. The Chinese attacked under the cover of this fire and overran both positions. Subsequent events indicate that the Pork Chop operation was a diversion but the enemy intended to stay on Baldy.
The enemy was unable to achieve his goal on Baldy because the Regiment did not give him time to consolidate and organize his position. Constant pressure was maintained on him by combat patrols, tank fire, artillery and mortar fire and air strikes.
On the night of 20-21 September 1952 a seemingly complicated but well coordinated counter attack succeeded in retaking the hill.
Once the hill was retaken the immediate problem was holding against enemy counter attack. Bunkers and communication trenches were almost totally destroyed by the proceeding action. Temporary fighting positions were prepared from material salvaged on Baldy. Then a comprehensive plan was drawn up to construct a self sufficient defensive position. Where previously units had been required to improve positions with their own personnel, all the resources of the Regiment plus engineer and KSC labor were made available to the unit holding Baldy. Work details were set up from the reserve battalion to string barbed wire. The results of this concerted effort has been the steady progress to a truly6 strong defensive position well dug in with plenty of protective wire and a well coordinated defensive fire plan.
Bunkers must be dug in so that only the top protection shows above the surface. Vertical bracing is not enough to stand up under repeated direct hits. Interlocking logs or timber built log cabin style is required. On hill such as these they should be set in the hill with one corner projecting out from the hillside so that grazing fire can be secured. Too many bunkers provide a fine view of the enemy but very small fields of effective fire.
During the period before 18 September 1952 materials such as logs and concertina wire were in short supply and the Regiment was attempting to stay within the ASR on ammunition. The diminution of our fire was countered by an increase in that of the enemy. This increase progressed with an insidiousness that allowed him to punish us severely without it appearing abnormal.
To coordinate the effort of the reconstruction of the Baldy defenses we stayed within the framework of normal command responsibility rather than setting up a special task organization. This has proven most successful.
Roy Brooks Lt Col Inf Exec Officer.
During this period the Regiment continued its occupation of the LINE JAMESTOWN.
For the period 1-18 September 1952 the emphasis was on improvement and rehabilitation of existing fighting positions. Bunkers were rebuilt, communication trenches deepened, and protective wire laid. All of this work was done under a steady increasing tempo of enemy mortar fire. This action reached a climax on 18 September 1952 when Pork Chop and Baldy received tremendous all day pounding by mortar and artillery to which was added direct fire artillery. This fire severely damaged these positions' bunkers that had previously been considered sound.
Just before dark the fire increased on these positions and the enemy began harrassing fire on the MSR. The Chinese attacked under the cover of this fire and overran both positions. Subsequent events indicate that the Pork Chop operation was a diversion but the enemy intended to stay on Baldy.
The enemy was unable to achieve his goal on Baldy because the Regiment did not give him time to consolidate and organize his position. Constant pressure was maintained on him by combat patrols, tank fire, artillery and mortar fire and air strikes.
On the night of 20-21 September 1952 a seemingly complicated but well coordinated counter attack succeeded in retaking the hill.
Once the hill was retaken the immediate problem was holding against enemy counter attack. Bunkers and communication trenches were almost totally destroyed by the proceeding action. Temporary fighting positions were prepared from material salvaged on Baldy. Then a comprehensive plan was drawn up to construct a self sufficient defensive position. Where previously units had been required to improve positions with their own personnel, all the resources of the Regiment plus engineer and KSC labor were made available to the unit holding Baldy. Work details were set up from the reserve battalion to string barbed wire. The results of this concerted effort has been the steady progress to a truly6 strong defensive position well dug in with plenty of protective wire and a well coordinated defensive fire plan.
Bunkers must be dug in so that only the top protection shows above the surface. Vertical bracing is not enough to stand up under repeated direct hits. Interlocking logs or timber built log cabin style is required. On hill such as these they should be set in the hill with one corner projecting out from the hillside so that grazing fire can be secured. Too many bunkers provide a fine view of the enemy but very small fields of effective fire.
During the period before 18 September 1952 materials such as logs and concertina wire were in short supply and the Regiment was attempting to stay within the ASR on ammunition. The diminution of our fire was countered by an increase in that of the enemy. This increase progressed with an insidiousness that allowed him to punish us severely without it appearing abnormal.
To coordinate the effort of the reconstruction of the Baldy defenses we stayed within the framework of normal command responsibility rather than setting up a special task organization. This has proven most successful.
Roy Brooks Lt Col Inf Exec Officer.
"Signed with his own rubber stamp"
