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Old 04-14-2015, 11:15 AM   #1
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Although quite a bit out of the focus of this forum, here is an perfect example of just what can be dug up with research.

The Bronze Star Medal is a fairly common award of the United States for achievement in the Armed Forces and with the "V" Device the fourth highest Valour award a member of the ground forces can be awarded for heroism in combat. Only around 2.2% of Bronze Star Medals have been awarded with the "V" Device.

The difficulty in researching these American awards is the fact that not only were a great deal issued unnamed (and there is a vast ocean of unissued stock on the market) but when a named example is found it is often to someone with a common name or is unable to be found. Like many other state archives they have had their accidents and losses (not to mention bureaucratic errors).

This example is named to William J. Morrison, this is the first step in revealing a tale of heroism, of an infantryman in North Korean territory, an area now in the Demilitarised Zone of the Democratic People's Republic Of Korea.

Finding a fully attributed, attributable and researched award for combat against Communist forces in de jure Communist territory is an obscure find. This was very much a case of luck and fitting all the pieces together - there are lots of pieces in this case.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:15 AM   #2
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Having the recipient's dog tag is of great assistance in supporting research.

Although it does not aid with a middle name it does have his service number "US21910831", indicates he was in service in 1952 and was Catholic.

There was at least one other William J. Morrison in service in 1952 but not with the same service number.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:16 AM   #3
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Running the service number through the United States National Archives returns his Purple Heart wound.

It shows that he was an Infantry Private in the 38th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division from Kings, New York (Brooklyn). Wounded whilst in the "North Korea Section".

This is of great assistance when tracking the action that lead to the Bronze Star Medal as it has been confirmed that he was deployed with the 38th Infantry Regiment on 7th September 1952.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:17 AM   #4
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I was then able to find the 2nd Infantry Division's Command Report for September 1952.

A great insight into what his Division was doing at the time he was wounded.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:17 AM   #5
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A· Introduction
The Eighth United States Army Korea was composed of three US corps (I, IX and X) and two ROK Corps (I and II). For months this army had defended positions astride the 38th parallel. I US corps defended the left (west) flank sector of' the Army. Adjacent to I US Corps was IX US Corps. (see Map A)
The 1st Marine, 1st British Commonwealth, 3d US Infantry and 2d US Infantry Divisions constituted I US corps.
In July the 2d Infantry Division had moved from IX US corps to I US Corps. There on 18 July it relieved the 45th US Infantry Division on Line JAMESTOWN. Its mission was to occupy and defend that line.
The reserve regiment was the I US Corps reserve and could not be committed without the prior approval of that headquarters.
All units not on Line JAMESTOWN conducted training. In August the mission of the division was enlarged by I US Corps. One battalion of the reserve regiment assisted by a minimum of two companies of the Korean Service corps was to construct and repair defensive installations on Line WYOMING. (see Map B)
During the months of July and August three noteworthy events occured in the 2d Division zone. The first was the loss and subsequent recapture of OLD BALDY (Hill 266), an outpost in the left regimental sector. The second was the annual Korean rainy season. The third event was the relief of the 23d Infantry by the 38th Infantry on 19 August.
The commanding officers and dispositions of the component units of the 2d Division were as follows:
Headquarters Capt. Wilbur R. Coleman
Headquarters Company Capt. Charles W. Detert
2d Division Band WOJG Ray O. Mccune
2d Signal Company Lt. Patrick O'Donnell
2d Military Police Company Capt. E. E. Keller
702 Ordnance Company Lt. Doyle
2d Quartermaster Company Lt. Ben F. Wallace
2d Replacement Company Capt. A. J. Nowak
2d Reconnaissance Company Capt. Nils F. Hallstrom
72d Tank Battalion Lt-Co.l A. R. Cheek
2d Medical Battalion Capt. Vernon L. Cotterman
2d Engineer Combat Battalion Maj. Fred B. Waters
9th Infantry Regiment Col. Maurice D. Stratta
23d Infantry Regiment Col. Joseph W. Stillwell
38th Infantry Regiment Lt-Co.l William F. Kernan (1-23)
Col. A. W. Stuart (24-30)

2d Division Artillery Brig-Gen. Thomas M. Watlington

The commanding officers and dispositions of major tactical units
attached to the division were as follows:
French Battalion Lt-Col. Francois Borreill
Netherlands Detachment Lt-Col. Cornelius Schilpeoord
Thailand Battalion Maj. Kriangsak Chomanan

During this five week period (26 July - 31 August) a total of thirty inches of rainfall was recorded. As a result of this deluge surface water washed out or damaged roads, caused 375 bunkers to collapse, destroyed, damaged and weakened bridges, destroyed communications trenches and dislocated mines. As the period closed all units of the division were exerting maximum effort to repair the damage.
1 - 18 September
As the period opened on 1 September the 2d Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map B·
Upon arrival of the 2d Division in the CHORWON sector, the 38th Infantry became the I US Corps reserve. For one month it trained and readied its equipment. During the period 17 - 20 August it relieved the 23d Infantry.
The 23d in its turn became the corps reserve and commenced a four week training cycle.
Early in the month plans were made to effect the relief of the 9th Infantry by the 23d Infantry during the period 18 - 21 September. On 11 September the 23d underwent a Combat Readiness Test to determine the results of the reserve period training program and the amount of administrative improvement achieved. The general and special staffs assured General Fry that the regiment was in excellent condition.
Operations Order Number 45 was approved and issued 12 September. The relief was to commence 18 September and was to be completed prior to 0600 hours on the 21st. The 9th Infantry was ordered to occupy Line WYOMING with one battalion. This battalion was to be supported by a minimum of two companies of Korean Service Corps troops. Its mission was to continue construction on the line. The remainder of the regiment would conduct a maximum amount of training in camp INDIANHEAD.
As can be seen on the map each front line regiment occupied two lines: the outpost line of resistance and the main line of resistance.
The outpost line consisted of a series of isolated strong points across the division front. Units manning the outposts were furnished by the battalions on the main line of resistance. Reserve battalions remained intact in assembly areas.
Within the division sector, hill mass 477 (3233) - 487 (3433) was the key terrain feature. Located in the 9th Infantry's zone, it dominated the entire area to the north and to the south. Leading into the division defenses were many avenues of approach. The most dangerous of these were the CHORWON - T'OSAN corridor (1140-1334), the ORIJONG (3037) - CHU'TOSO (3036) - TOKSAN-NI (3234) Corridor, and the corridor leading south east from Hill 265 (2635) and extending into the division sector along road 2833 - 3032. Guarding approaches into the sector were Hill 266 (2532) nicknamed OLD BALDY and Hill 191 (ARSENAL) and EERIE (2935). These hills had been taken recently from the enemy by UN raiding activities.
Repeated enemy reconaissance and combat patrols gave the CCF troops much of the information they needed concerning our outpost and main line positions.
It was estimated that the enemy had six infantry battalions on line facing the division; that he could launch a limited attack with eight battalions
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:18 AM   #6
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at any time; that he could reinforce such an attack with eleven battalions within six hours, and with twelve additional battalions within twenty-four hours; and that he could support such attacks with abundant artillery and mortar fires. He was expected to launch repeated attacks to regain OLD BALDY, ARSENAL, and EERIE. He could attain very easily a manpower superiority of 3 to 1.
This estimate was confirmed by a TWX on 7 September. This message from the Commanding General I US Corps stated in part "that the enemy may attempt to seize and bold certain key terrain features along I Corps Front. Among these points are those terrain features over which there was extensive disagreement during the negotiations for the present line of demarcation, an example being Hill 266 (BALDY) 255321. Certain other points in which the enemy has manifested interest by his actions are Hills 191, 200 and EERIE (2935), Hill 117 (2123), KELLY (197223)......."
The 38th Infantry had already inaugurated an extensive program for the increased defensive strength of BALDY, ARSENAL and EERIE. The commanding General and the Assistant Division Commander constantly visited the units defending these hills.
The enemy proved to be extremely sensitive to the attempted improvement and rehabilitation of the defenses on BALDY. At first, soldiers attempted to erect double apron fences on the forward slopes. Fire from the Chinese prevented these. An alternate solution, however, was successful for a short period. Knife rests were constructed and barbed wire attached to them.
These were carried to the crest of the outpost positions during daylight. During the hours of darkness, work parties would carry them to positions on the forward slope and anchor them. When the enemy became aware of this, he commenced an extensive program of harrassing and interdicting fire. progress then slowed.
At the same time they were erecting barriers, troops on the outpost repaired and strengthened previously damaged fighting bunkers and reassembled prefabricated ''Abe Lincoln" fighting bunkers on the hill. communications trenches were deepened and tank positions were dozed by the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion. This improvement was also hindered by the Chinese artillery and mortar fire.

18 September (see situation map preceding patrols summary)
The tempo or the fire against troops on BALDY began to quicken on the 16th. From 16 - 18 September the fire against our troops on BALDY steadily became heavier and heavier. Coincident with this increase was the increase in the number of observed enemy tanks and recoilless rifles firing at the hill.
As the firing became heavier on BALDY adjacent defensive positions were taken under enemy fire.
During the four hour period 0935 to 1305 hours on the 18th, 400 shells fell on BALDY, 100 on PORK CHOP and 85 on WESTVIEW. The increase continued.
In the one hour period 1750 - 1850, 200 rounds landed on BALDY. The climax was reached in the next ten minutes when 1,000 shells dropped on BALDY and from 300 - 500 on PORK CHOP. All indications pointed to the attack that was about to be launched. All troops were alerted.
The enemy followed swiftly behind their final preparatory fires.
Immediately after the fires were lifted and shifted to other targets in the regimental sector, Chinese were in the defensive positions of both outposts.
An estimated two enemy companies assaulted BALDY from the front (North) and from the flank (East). The coordinated assault was successful. The shock of the preparatory fires and the surprise gained by the fast moving Chinese troops were both to their advantage. Within forty minutes after the assault they had control of the hill. Elements of K Company retained control of isolated portions of the position but the enemy was dominant. one of his first actions was to establish a platoon blocking force in the approach from the east.
At this time (1940 hours) the company commander requested VT and 'quad .50' fire on his positions. Five minutes later communication was lost with the remaining defenders. It was never reestablished.

The assault against the platoon of Company B on PORK CHOP was also a coordinated frontal (North) and flank (West) attack. Here, too, surprise achieved success. After the first few moments of hand-to-hand combat in the trenches a handful of our troops retained control of but a small portion of the position. Communications were better, however, with PORK CHOP. Radio contact was maintained between the company commander on the hill and the company command post.
The action on PORK CHOP appeared to be a diversionary raid. By 2330 hours the enemy had completely swept the area, evacuated their dead and wounded and had withdrawn. A platoon was dispatched to reinforce the position; it reached the top of PORK CHOP without encountering the enemy.
As previously stated, all troops had been alerted prior to the enemy's assault. When the commanding officer, company K requested fire on his positions at 1940 hours, the regimental commander ordered a company sent forward from the reserve battalion. Company E was selected. Its mission (less one platoon) was to occupy a previously reconnoitered blocking position at 266321. one platoon was to continue forward with the mission of establishing contact with the enemy.
This position was occupied as a precaution against enemy exploitation.
While Company E was moving forward to its positions, a platoon from Company L was brought forward, briefed and at 2200 hours was sent across Check Point Easy to BALDY. Its mission was to make contact with whatever force was on the hill. The patrol moved cautiously toward its objective.
BY 2300 hours the only firing was that of 'quad .50's' firing over the hill. The enemy had complete control. The situation remained vague and no movement could be seen on BALDY.

At midnight company E (minus one platoon) occupied its position and one platoon continued to BUCK'S BARN. No information had been received from the Company L patrol.
19 September
About 0230 hours firefights broke out on both east and west slopes. The platoon from Company E had passed BUCK'S BARN and while proceeding up the communication trench was taken under fire by the enemy blocking force. The company L platoon had become involved with an unknown number of enemy and was being subjected to both artillery and mortar fire.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:19 AM   #7
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These firefights continued sporadically throughout the night. Neither platoon was able to advance. At 0600 the regimental commander decided to place Company G in the positions occupied by Company L and then reorganize the scattered 3d Battalion. The platoon of Company E had been forced to withdraw and had joined its parent unit. The L Company platoon remained in its position on the west slope. Company G relieved Company L by 0800 hours. At noon Company L (minus one platoon) together with elements of Company K, elements of Company E and a platoon of tanks made an unsuccessful counterattack.
The Commanding General, I US Corps, ordered that the attack to recapture the hill coincide with an attack in the 2d Infantry Division zone. The Chinese had captured KELLY Hill (197223) the previous night as well as BALDY.
Ultimately it was decided that the time of the attack would be 2045 hours

20 September.
The plan formulated by the commanding officer, 2d Battalion followed the plan successfully used by the 23d Infantry in July when it recaptured BALDY.
Company F would attack up the right (East) finger while Company G attacked up the left (West) finger. The attack would be non-illuminated and non-supported. The other two battalions on the right would make demonstrations. The situation on the 19th was as follows: the 2d Battalion was preparing for the attack the next night; Company G was committed, Company E in the blocking position was disorganized and company F was in the 2d Battalion assembly area. It would. be necessary to replace both Companies G and E. The 23d Infantry and the 9th Infantry were in the middle of a relief. Troops would have to be obtained either from divisional units or from battalions of the 38th Infantry on Line JAMESTOWN.
General Fry's decision was to attach the 2d Reconaissance company and one platoon of Company C, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion to the 38th Infantry.
After the attack the position would have to be reorganized and almost entirely reconstructed. The regimental reserve would have to be reconstructed.
The equivalent of one platoon remained of Company E. Companies K and L were also depleted.
The relief of the 9th Infantry would be completed the night of 21-22 September. Prior to that time the 1st and 3d Battalions would be in the reserve area. The 2d Battalion would be occupying and reconstructing Line WYOMING. After the night of 21-22 September the 1st, 3d and Thailand Battalions would be in the reserve area. permission was requested and received from the Commanding General, I US Corps to utilize the 2d Battalion on Line JAMESTOWN for the minimum time necessary for the 38th Infantry to reorganize.
Plans were made for the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry; to relieve the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion would then relieve the 2d and 3d Battalions (less Company I) as soon as possible. The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry would be relieved as soon as the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry was reorganized. These plans would allow the 1st Battalion to concentrate its efforts on the reconstruction of the positions on the hill, permit the reconstruction of the regimental reserve, and give the 2d and 3d Battalions full opportunity to reorganize. As the work load lessened in the BALDY area the 1st Battalion would relieve the 2d Reconaissance Company and Company I. The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry would then be relieved by the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry and it would return to Line WYOMING.
During the day artillery and air strikes were directed at a 11 known enemy installations in the immediate vicinity of BALDY. From 0700 - 1800 hours eighteen air strikes were directed at lucrative targets with excellent results.
By 2100 hours both companies G and I had been relieved.
A platoon patrol from I company departed at 2330 hours. It was to contact the enemy on BALDY.

20 September
At 0600 hours the patrol made its first contact with the enemy at 255322.
The enemy withdrew and the patrol continued. Three hours later it reached the fifth bunker where it again made contact. The platoon remained in this position until Company G passed it that night.

During the day ten air strikes were again directed against targets in the immediate vicinity of BALDY. Three tanks from vantage points fired all day at enemy positions on the hill.

At 2045 hours the two companies crossed the line of departure. The deomonstrations proceeded as scheduled. Within a half hour Company G passed through the Company I patrol and Company F was moving against light resistance; the 2d Battalion requested that the M-16's in the 1st and Netherlands sectors lift their fires as the advancing troops were about to mask them.
For the next hour both companies moved slowly but without opposition.
Two platoons of Company G occupied their objective. The company had received no casualties.
At 2330 hours Company F was (above 257324) receiving heavy artillery and mortar fire. The incoming fire stalled Company F and Company E was ordered to reinforce it. At the same time the outpost on PORK CHOP observed enemy troops believed to be withdrawing from BALDY. Mortar, artillery and automatic weapons fire was placed on them.
21 September
Company F made no advance while Company E was moving forward to join it.
At 0145 hours when company E did join, however, the combined companies began to move forward. Wire communications from battalion headquarters to Company G was good but there was no radio contact; the opposite was true for Company F.
Companies E and F continued to advance against light resistance; the number of incoming rounds had decreased considerably. At 0615 hours they joined Company G on the objective.
The previously conceived plan for the reorganization of the 38th Infantry was placed into effect. It was executed without difficulty and on 27 September the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry returned to Line WYOMING and the 2d Reconaissance Company reverted to division control.
The rehabilitation of BALDY and the T-BONE, however, was progressing slowly.
on 28 September General Fry ordered that Company C, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion be attached to the 38th Infantry. Operations Instructions 159 stipulated that one platoon would be utilized on the T-BONE and that the company (minus) would be employed on BALDY· The mission of the company was to assist in the construction and improvement of obstacles and field fortifications.
At 1800 hours 24 September G3, I US corps passed a warning order to G3,
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:20 AM   #8
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2d Division. one US battalion was to move to KIMPO PENINSULA (BS8774). There it would relieve the 1st battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division. Its missions would be to conduct training, provide security for a designated sector and prepare plans (in coordination with the commanding Officer, KIMPO Provisional Regiment) for commitment in an operational role on KIMPO PENINSULA. The battalion would remain under 2d Division control, would be committed by order of I US corps only and would be attached to the 1st US Marine Division for Class I and III supplies only. The relief was to be completed not later than 1200 hours 26 September. G3, I Corps stated that the battalion would remain there indefinitely.
The commanding Officer, 9th Infantry selected the 1st Battalion to make the move.
BY 2000 hours the movement plan had been prepared, approved, and coordinated with I US Corps Transportation Officer. Rolling stock had been obtained. The advance party would depart by vehicle the next morning (25 September) at 0800 hours. The truck convoy would follow at 1000 hours. Troops would move by rail to YONGDUNG-PO (CS1554). There they would be met by trucks obtained by a member of the 2d Division Transportation section.
The 1st Battalion assumed responsibility for the sector at 261200 September as ordered.
The reason for the move of the 1st Battalion was learned on 29 September when another commitment of the reserve regiment was ordered. The 1st ROK Division would relieve the 3d US Infantry Division in its sector prior to 0600 hours 1 October. The 15th Infantry Regiment (minus), 3d Infantry Division which provided security for CAMP CASEY (CS3198) would be relieved by the 9th Infantry on 1 October.
On 30 September elements of the 3d Battalion assumed responsibility for the security of FTC #1 and the 608th AC & W Radar station at CAMP CASEY. The remainder of the regiment (less 1st Battalion) was preparing to join them there.

A summary of the month's operations would not be complete without reference to patrol activities. Except for the BALDY engagement, patrols provided the only contacts with the enemy. Brief accounts of noteworthy patrols are attached to this report.

A summary of our losses in material in the operation at BALDY include the following major items: 1 M-39, 10 IMG's, 31 BAR's, 2-60 mm mortars, 5 cal .50 MG's, 2-57 mm recoilless rifles, 5-3.5" rocket launchers, 18 ammunition carrying bags, 5 flame throwers, 23 compasses, 3 cal .30 MG's (1917), 15 SCR 300's, 18 SCR 536's, 29 SE-8's, 40 TS 10's, 3 SB-18's, 23 CE-11's, 12 DR-8's, 18 TL-33's, 3 AP-50's, and 1 SE-11.

A summary of damage done to the enemy is restricted to casualties.
Itemization of other damage is contained in Periodic Intelligence Reports.

.......................Total September...BALDY
Counted Killed..............182............149
Estimated Killed...........1445............442
Estimated Wounded......2375...........679

During the initial phases of the attacks on BALDY communication was lost with the forward observer there. Adjacent observation posts and liaison officers maintained direct artillery support for our troops on the hill. Additional radios and two forward observer parties were placed in immediate reserve as replacements.
To deal effectively with the coordinated attacks (BALDY and PORK CHOP), the 37th Field Artillery Battalion (general support) was made available to the liaison officer to the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry which defended PORK CHOP. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion was then free to concentrate its fire on BALDY· From 1940 - 2040 hours 18 September Division Artillery provided illumination of the battlefield. This ceased when a flare ship arrived.
For the attack of the 2d Battalion to capture BALDY, division artillery carefully planned, scheduled and coordinated fires with supporting fires from I US Corps and the 3d US Infantry Division. During the night of 20-21 September these fires were executed. In addition to these fires I US Corps Artillery fired counter-mortar missions at the request of division artillery. Again illumination was provided until a flare ship arrived.
During the month every patrol that left our main line of resistance or outpost line of resistance was coordinated with division artillery. concentrations were planned by the unit forward observer and the patrol leader. The forward observers remained in contact with the patrol by wire and radio until it returned.
One platoon of the 82d AAA AW Battalion (SP) was in direct support of each regiment on Line JAMESTOWN. These platoons fired both prearranged fires and harrassing and interdiction fires. During the period 1-18 September, two M-39's personnel carriers transported supplies to BALDY and EERIE. From 19-30 September four carriers were so used.

During the month of September one company of the 72d Tank Battalion was in direct support of each front line regiment. on 24 September the three 105 mm howitzers (assault guns) were placed under the operational control of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion.

The bulk of the engineer effort during September was devoted to the repair of the damage caused by the rainy season and to the improvement of the lines of communication. The log bunker and the attack bunker program was continued and accelerated.

During the month aircraft were available for but fifteen days. For the period 1-18 September13 of the 65 air strikes requested were honored. During the BALDY operation, all requests were honored. on the 19th, 20th and 21st, 38 requests were honored. These strikes involved 150 aircraft. Flare ships illuminated the BALDY area on the nights of 18-19 and 20-21 September.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:20 AM   #9
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During September the combat efficiency of the 2d US Infantry Division was considered to be excellent.
As a result of the operations during September the 2d Division continued to occupy and defend its assigned sector of Line JAMESTOWN. At the close of the period the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry was on KIMPO PENINSULA and the 9th Infantry (minus 1st Battalion)(Thailand Battalion attached) was preparing to assume responsibility for CAMP CASEY.

The 2d Division was faced by five battalions of infantry on line. An estimated thirty-one battalions were available as reserves. It was estimated that the strength of the units in contact and of the reserves available were 2,500 and 28,000 respectively.
The 1st Battalion, 345th Regiment, 115th Division, 39th CCF Army was in contact between the 24-26 grid lines; the 2d and 3d Battalions of this regiment were in the grid squares 2233 and 2334 respectively. The 3d and 1st Battalions, 337th Regiment, 113th Division, 38th CCF Army was in contact
between the 26-30 NS grid lines; the 2d Battalion was in reserve in the vicinity of 2538. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 339th Regiment, were in contact between the 30-36 NS grid lines; the 1st Battalion was in reserve in the vicinity of 3143.
The 338th Regiment was in division reserve but could not be located. Reserves capable of intervention were the 343d Regiment, 115th Division located in the vicinity of 1832, the 117th Division, 39th CCF Army located in the vicinity of 1229; the 112th Division, 38th CCF Army located in the vicinity of 2755, and the 341st Regiment, 114th Division, located in grid square 3352. The organization of the two CCF Armies which faced the Indianhead Division were:
39th CCF Army (064437)*
Artillery Regiment..117th Division (1229)..116th Division..115th Division
.........................349th Regiment........346th Regiment..343d Regiment
.........................350th Regiment........347th Regiment..344th Regiment
.........................351st Regiment........348th Regiment..345th Regiment

38th CCF Army (276607 or 278621)*
Artillery Regiment..112th Division (2755)..113th Division.....114th Division (354555)
........................334th Regiment..........337th Regiment..340th Regiment
........................335th Regiment..........338th Regiment..341st Regiment
........................336th Regiment..........339th Regiment..342d Regiment
*Coordinates are of command posts

The enemy's combat efficiency was considered to be good. The fairly high quality of the troops and their state of preparedness enhanced this efficiency. Morale seemed to vary proportionally to the political indoctrination and the beliefs of the individual. Morale of the average soldier was good.
Around the 18th of September it was apparent that changes in the disposition of enemy units were being effected. Increased troop sightings, increased harassing fires, new emplacements of active artillery and a decided change in radio traffic and security led to this belief. On several occasions the enemy attempted to move large elements of troops during periods of reduced daylight visibility.
The 1st Battalion, 344th Regiment, 115th Division, 39th CCF Army shifted to the west and relieved the 2d Battalion, 344th Regiment. At the same time the 345th Regiment moved into positions to the east of the 344th Regiment; the 1st Battalion replaced the 1st Battalion, 344th Regiment and the 2d and 3d Battalions formed the reserves to the NW and N respectively.
The 338th Regiment, 113th Division, 38th CCF Army was relieved by the 342d and 340th Regiments, ll4th Division. The 338th Regiment moved into division reserve but its exact location could not be determined. The 342d
Regiment placed its 2d and 3d Battalions on line between the 36-42 NS grid lines; the 1st Battalion was in reserve. The 340th Regiment had one battalion on line between the 42-45 NS grid lines and had two battalions in reserve. A correction was made in the proposed boundary line between the 337th and 339th Regiments, 113th Division. The boundary was changed from 265410-290392 to 300380-301360.
Elements of the 1st Battalion, 345th Regiment, 115th Division were identified by enemy documents taken from CCF bodies found on BALDY on 20 September.
This indicated that the unit in position on the main line of resistance was used to make this attack. In mid-July a reserve unit "passed through" front line elements to attack BALDY.
An estimated company attacked PORK CHOP. Personal papers taken from the clothing of enemy dead on 19 September identified the 3d Battalion, 337th Regiment, 113th Division. This further indicated the use of a front line unit in the attack.
To maintain security the enemy continued to use an outpost line of resistance. The enemy defensive positions consisted mostly of fighting bunkers with long, connecting communication trenches. They were exceedingly well 'dug in' and well camouflaged. A second line of resistance appeared to have been maintained a proximately 10,000 meters to the rear of the first.
The natural commanding terrain was occupied by the enemy. Lowlands and avenues of approach were protected by automatic weapons. Friendly elements encountered heavily mined areas in front of enemy positions. In instances demolitions were believed to have been electrically controlled. A large percentage of the mines and charges used were of the concussion type.
Artillery support for units in contact were an estimated seven artillery battalions deployed across the division front and which consisted of an estimated sixty-three pieces. Three of the seven battalions were believed to be 75/76 mm and three to be 122 mm howitzer; the seventh was believed to be a self-propelled 75/76 mm battalion.
The majority of the hostile batteries firing into the 2d Division sector were located beyond the capabilities of artillery organic to the division.
These battalions were positioned near the extension of united Nations divisional boundaries. This enabled them to fire into two UN sectors. The enemy apparently had prepared at least one alternate position for each artillery piece; some of which were stocked with ammunition. 250 alternate positions were counted across the division front.
There was one artillery regiment identified as the 26th Regiment, 1st Artillery Division, tentatively located at 312248. one anti-tank regiment identified as the 404th Regiment of the 32d AT Division was located in the vicinity of 217408. The 27th Artillery Regiment, 1st Artillery Division was reported to be located in the vicinity of 184423.
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Old 04-14-2015, 11:21 AM   #10
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1 September

Officers 1146
EM 17229

Officers 1009
EM 16319

Total Gains
Officers 159
EM 1542

Officers 115
EM 1042

Hospital Returnees
Officers 23
EM 392

Administrative Gains
Officers 21
EM 108

Requisitions Outstanding
EM 2058

30 September


Total Losses

Battle Losses

Non-Battle Losses

Administrative Losses


Status as of 31 Aug +500 -174 -716 -588 -248
%Over or Short Based on Auth strength: +7.5% -3.8% -28.9% -46.3% -50%
Gains to 30 Sep 191 104 67 45 6
September Promotion Quota: 653 111 156 55 19
Effect of Gains +1344 +41 -493 -488 -223
Actual Losses through 30 Sep. 452 316 173 115 15
Unrotated for Sep 130 211 102 31 25
Over (+) or Short (-) 30 Sep +762 -486 -768 -634 -263
%Over or Short Based on Auth strength +11.4% -10.7% -31.5% -50% -53%
%Loss or Gain since 31 Aug +3.9% -6.9% -2.6% -3.7% -3%
If the Rates of Loss and Gain Continues,
We would look like this 1 Jul 53: +46.5% -72.8% -54.9% -83.3% -80%

There were 2458 class II personnel assigned which represented 13.4 percent of the authorized aggregate strength.
Assignment of replacements to the 2d Division by Eighth Army is not sufficient to replace casualties and sustain rotation. The criteria for rotation (accrual of the required CMS plus an available qualified replacement) was difficult for the men to understand: especially that part which required an available replacement. This failure to understand it was due in part to a previously adequate flow of replacements which had permitted rotation of all personnel when eligible. Raising the number of points necessary for rotation in October temporarily relieved the personnel shortage. It did not benefit morale.
During September 278 Class II replacements were received. Rotation could not be effected against these replacements as they were assigned to units understrength class II personnel. The plan was to level the percentage of class II personnel within subordinate units at 13 percent. Most of the personnel eligible for rotation were in the regiments. These already had 13 percent class II personnel assigned.
The majority of· replacements received continued to be basic infantry soldiers, grade E2. Assigned grade strength compared to authorized grade strength reveals the following shortages as of 30 September: E7, 263; E6, 634; ES, 768; and E4, 486. Time in grade and position vacancy requirements were such as to predicate the eventual elimination of assigned grade strength in the upper four grades. (see Chart 1) Monthly promotion quotas received from EUSAK are inadequate to sustain strength. Qualified NCO replacements, therefor, must be assigned. In numerous instances enlisted men are performing the duties of two grades higher. It is not unusual to find Sergeants First Class acting as First Sergeants, Corporals as Platoon Sergeants and Privates First Class as squad and assistant squad leaders. The latter presents a problem since a soldier can not be punished for failure to obey the order of an acting non-commissioned officer.
At the close of the period there was a shortage of experienced captains,
infantry company commanders; infantry officers with communication and motor maintenance background; and warrant officers, unit administrators. Other critical officer shortages and expected losses were: Lt Ccol, AG (2110) Div AG; Lt Col, CE {1331) Bn Comdr; Lt Col, Inf (8104) CAO; Lt Col, MPC (9101) FM; Lt Col, MC (3500) Med Bn Comdr; Lt Col, MC (3100) Med Staff Off; Lt Col, Ord (4512) Ord Off; Maj, CE {2162) Bn S3; Maj, MC (3005) Prevenative Med; Maj, MC (3130) Neuropsychiatrist; three Maj, MC ( 3500) Med Off Comd; Maj , DE (3175) Prosthodentist; Maj, DE (3178) Staff Dental Off; Capt, Inf (4210) Div PX Off; and a Lt, QM (2430) GFO. Battery grade artillery officer losses would have been extremely high if rotation had been permitted upon attainment of EUSAK eligibility criteria. The average rotation criteria for 2d Division Artillery officers was 41 CMS. Category IV personnel were not released until 35 days prior to their ETS because of the existiilg shortage. Expected losses of artillery officers during october: 80 cat IV (ETS) and 36 on CMS.
There were 105 courts-martials during september: 2 General, 30 Special
and 73 Summary. In general the cases were included under Articles of the code 86, 91, 92, 113, 121, 128 and 134.
Of the 214 deceased or enemy buried ten were unidentified.
US 127, ROKA 21, Netherlands Det. 4, UNKNOWN 10, ENEMY BURIED 62
Enemy dead were buried in the Chommel Enemy Cemetary #1, Chommel, Korea
The Korean draft administrator was relieved from attached to the Civil Affairs section and attached to the CIC Team at the PWE. This permitted more expedient processing of indigenous personnel. All civilians living north of the Farm Line in the Chongson-Myon area were registered. This facilitated the apprehension of civilians not authorized to be in the area. A questionnaire was prepared which would be used to reflect the political, economic, and social developments within the populated communities of the division area. The civilian evacuation policy was changed. Prostitutes were charged and placed in custody of the Uijongbu National Police for booking, fingerprinting, and further action as deemed necessary. Other mature civilians were placed in the custody of the National Police who returned them to their home area. Orphans and children under sixteen years of age were evacuated through the Uijongbu Civilian Hospital. Using DDT, the Civil Affairs section instigated a program to eliminate enciphalitis breeding areas. The morale of the division was excellent. The maximum. use of Rest and Recuperation and post Exchange facilities, full religious coverage, and touring USO Shows, plus other special service activities were major contributions to the excellent morale. tack of adequate replacements limited rotation and inadequate promotion quotas were factors detrimental to morale. 194 officers and 1521 enlisted men visited Rest and Recuperation centers.
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