Who was the greatest strategic genius?

[Art]

??? News to me Ed, are you saying you tried to vote and it won't let you? There are no member or adminstrative options on allowing certain people to vote, so if you are having trouble it must be in the board itself. Let me know..

Art

[Nota Bene]

Christian,

The way I see it other members of the forum had posted some valid arguments for Zhukov, and you could not present even a single fact to support your point of view. All you do is insult forum members who happen to disagree with you.

A.

[Ed Maier]

Christian,

Now you have resorted back to your name calling. Shame on you. Please present an argument for your point of view. Your name calling just shows that you do not have an argument. All you have to do is cite the book, page and sentence from Col. Glantz's book that backs up your argument. You continue to fail to do so.

I for one, am tired of lisiten to your name calling and arguments that have no historical or factual data to back them up. You sound like the judges at the Show Trials. "You must adhere to the Party line or else!" I am not a right wing lacky but an educated scholar who studies the war from multiple perspectives, including the Soviet point of view. I have studied Soviet Military History at one of the most prestigious Russian Universities (St. Petersburg University) and have conducted research at the military office that Col. Glantz helped create, The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. I dare say that you will not find one scholar who agrees with your off the wall name calling and assurtions of bonapartism, or your deffinition of strategy (though you might find some that agree with your argument for Vasilevskii if you would just take the time to present one, including myself.) at FMSO.

I have made multiple arguments for my position on Zhukov. I have added the 1939 Battle of Khalkin-Gol because it has such great strategic ramifications for the 1940s and the Red Army. It is one of the most strategically influential battles in the 20th Century. But Khalkin-Gol aside, I still believe I have made a clear case for Zhukov in 1941-45.

Please just give us a fact.

Take care,
Ed

[Ed Maier]

Art,

When I try to vote in the poll I get this message:

"The action you have attempted could not be performed as your session appears to be invalid. Click the below link to attempt this action again with a new session. "

I have voted in other polls before but am unable to do so in this one.

Thanks,
Ed

[alconlon]

I felt that Vasilevsky and Zhukov were close but I could not vote for Zhukov because of some of his actions in the Battle of Berlin.

I saw a documentary several years ago and in it they showed that Zhukov had purposely attacked and slaughtered thousands of Soviet troops under the command of another General.This was done so that Zhukov would take Berlin first.

Happy hunting.

Thanks,Al

[Ed Maier]

Christian,

First off, your citations for Vasilievsky have already been addressed and in some cases countered, yet you do not make any rebuttal. You claim support for Vasilevski based on operational planning and battlefield exploits, but then say that others should only consider operational planning.

Moscow cannot be called a 50% victroy as the victory was the survival of the USSR to fight on and not surrender in the winter of 1941. Their overextended winter campaign can be blamed on Stalin being to ambitious and believing that he could destroy all of Army Group Center when it was not possible given Soviet resources. Once again, without the USSR's survival Stalingrad doesn't happen.

I do not see your point about Mars. It was a defeat but as I mentioned before, a defeat doesn't mean that a leader is not a strategic genius. Napolean was defeated but he was one of the greatest strategic geniuses of all time. Your coralation between the defeat at Mars and an Allied defeat at Normandy is not relivant. Its comparing apples to oranges. Both the size differences in the Fronts, manpower involved, geographic considerations and type of assault involved render your comparision pointless. If I follow your logic, I could make the point that if the Allies had suffered the 3,000,000 KIA/MIA that the Soviets suffered in 1941, we would have had a difficult time winning the war and might not have participated. Its a pointless argument that does not bolster your case.

The "disaster at Seelow Heights" was as much a fault of Stalin's political pressure to capture Berlin by 1 May then anything else. There could be no deviation from a frontal assault on the Heigths. Zhukov's use of searchlights was a tactical error, but certainly was not a strategic error. He did commit his Tank Armies too early but once again this was under the direct pressure of Stalin and is a tactical not a strategic problem. As for causalties, the Soviets never cared about them. Only victory was important.

As for Vasilevskii, his operation in Mongolia was not proof of a "Strategic greatness" in that the war was over before the USSR joined and had little strategic value toward the ending of W.W.II. The Japanese Army in China could not support Japan against an American invasion as no shipping was available to transport them. Stalin joined the war only in an effort to grab more land. Now it was strategic in setting up the military-political situation in the Far East for the Cold War. And the operation was briliant in its use of logistics and maneuver. Its one of the greateat ever.

Your personal attacks and attempts at showing name calling are laughable and beyond comment.

In our ealier emails, I still didn't find a serious quotation that meant anything. Since we are in a public forum, please post them here for all to see and read.

The only person not speaking the truth is you Christian. You continue to misrepresent, spin and tarnish others in a never ending assult on others.

Just my opinion,
Ed

[Ed Maier]

Since I have asked others to support there case with examples, I will try to do so here. While I do not believe that Zhukov was a perfect commander, I do think that he merits votes. While he did not win every battle (Glantz's book, "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat" points that out) this does not disqualify him either. Here are some quotations about Zhukov and his role in the war from various historical works:

On Zhukov's importance at Leningrad,

"Zhukov, the toughest troubleshooter in the Red Army, the man who had been Chief of Staff at the war's outbreak, who had been thrown in at Yelnya on the Western Front when the going got rough and who was now facing the most difficult assignment in his career...." p. 320. Harrison Salisbury, "The 900 Days: The Seige of Leningrad." Harper and Row, 1969.

"Stalin (speaking to Zhukov) received the report siently (that the Germans had backed off from Leningrad), then, after a puase, said that the Moscow situation was serious, particularly on the Western Front.
'Turn your command over to your deputy and come to Moscow,' Stalin ordered." p. 351, Harrison Salisabury, "The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad."

On why Zhukov's role was deminished at wars end:

"Stalin's decision to assume direct control was obviously intended to enhance his postwar prestige and reduce that of his most prominant wartime marshals, especially Zhukov." p. 237, David Glantz & Jonathan House, "When Titans Clashed; How the Red Army Stopped Hitler." University of Kansas Press, 1995.

On Vasilevsky importance to Stalin at the same time (Oct. 1944):

"Vasilevsky, in fact, was relegated to the largely nominal role of Stavka coordinator for the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts on the northern flank." p. 238, Glantz, "When Titans Clashed."

On the duel role played by Zhukov and Vasilivsky in Planning Operation Uranus:

"The long series of strategic and operational failures - produced in part by Stalin's reliance on his own military intuition and that of numerous political cronies instead of the sound advise of his military experts, such as G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky - finally persuaded Stalin to trust the professional military ..." p. 129, Glantz, "When Titans Clashed."

On blaming Zhukov for the failure of the winter offensive in 1941-42 and calling Moscow a 50% victory:

"Zhukov and other commanders opposed the general offensive on the grounds that it would dissipate available forces over too wide a frontage." p. 91. Glantz, "When Titans Clashed."

On Zhukov's role in strategic victory at Moscow and importance to final victory:

"Events occured in the period from July to September 1941 which forever changed the course of the war. Instead of triumphs, the German Army experienced a series of delays and reversals culminating in a strategic defeat at the hands of Georgii Zhukov at the very gates of Moscow in December 1941." p. xi, Bryan Fugate & Lev Dvoretsky, "Thunder on the Dnepr: Zhukov - Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkreig." Presidio Press, 1997.

"The strategy and tactics used at Yelnia by the Russians were honed and fine-tuned by Zhukov until he perfected them on an enormous scale around Moscow in December." p. xiv, Fugate, "Thunder on the Dnepr."

"..the defeat of Barbarossa was much more due to the strategic vision of two remarkable men, Zhukov and Timoshenko. Without them, unquestionably, the war would have had a much different ending." p. xiv, Fugate, "Thunder on the Dnepr."

I wish I could find more quotations but I found these in about 15 minutes of looking. I also noted that Glantz was a strong supporter of Zhukov despite assurtions that he was not. Even in his book "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat" the theme is not that Zhukov was a failure, but that Zhukov made mistakes and was hard-headed.

I hope that this backs up my argument to some degree.

Just my opinion,
Ed