Jungle Expert Patch - Green Hell - Panama- US Army - Army Ranger Infantry - JOTC For Sale

Jungle Expert Patch - Green Hell - Panama- US Army - Army Ranger Infantry - JOTC
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Jungle Expert Patch - Green Hell - Panama- US Army - Army Ranger Infantry - JOTC:
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Jungle Expert PatchFORT SHERMAN,PANAMA - JUNGLE EXPERT SCHOOL
4 13/16\" X 4 1/2\" HIGHLY DETAILED EMBROIDERED PATCH
MERROWED EDGE - WAX BACKING
JUNGLE EXPERT SCHOOL WAS LOCATED HERE FROM 1953 to 1999
HOME OF THE JUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER(JOTC)
The Jungle Operations Training Center(JOTC) consists of 23,000 acres of single and double canopy jungle. JOTCprovides the United States Army the only jungle environment to traininfantry units in the art of jungle warfare. Fort Sherman is surroundedon the North and North-West by the Caribbean Sea, on the South andSouth-West by the Rio Chagres and the East by Limon Bay and the GatunLake.The cross-compartmentalized terrain on theJOTC consists of rolling hills, numerous tributaries, mangrove swampsand coastline. This training area is a unique and challenging trainingenvironment.

The USAJOTB operations section (S3) wasresponsible for coordinating all training on Fort Sherman. The 11Infantry, 11 OPFOR companies, 4 engineer companies, and 4 aircrewsurvival courses made the administration of this premier training centerintense. Additional, non-rotational units, use the JOTC regularly andensure year round usage.

While Army units comprised the lion share ofusers, Air Force, Navy, Marines, Reserve and National Guard units allreceived jungle warfare training at the JOTC. Aside from rotationalunits.

The Jungle Warfare Course (JWC) is a threeweek training event designed in a building block approach. The firstweek of training consists of individual soldier tasks and squadcollective tasks (for the infantry companies), that are likely to beperformed in a jungle environment. These tasks include: Jungle Living,Jungle Antennas, Land Navigation, Mines and Booby Traps (M&BT), jungleCombat Techniques (JCT), Waterborne Training, Squad React to Contact(Live Fire), and Squad Area Reconnaissance.

Additionally in week one, the battalion’sspecialty platoons (Scout, Mortar, and Engineer) conduct trainingprepared specially for them.

Specialized training for the Scout Platoonincludes: A Quick Fire (Live Fire) Course, Squad React to Contact,Battle Drills (Live Fire), Mines and Booby Traps (M&BT), Small BoatOperations, Rappelling, Intelligence Indicators, Pathfinder Operations,as well as the normal infantry Individual tasks.

Specialized training for the MortarPlatoon/Sections includes: Mortar Jungle Combat Techniques, M&BT, MortarManeuver Course (Live Fire), as well as the normal infantry individualtasks.

Specialized training for the Engineer Platoonincludes: Field Expedient Demolition (Live Fire) Training, M&BT, JCT,Small Boat Operations, as well as the normal infantry individual tasks.

Week two training consists of SituationalTraining Exercises (STXs) conducted at the Platoon and Company Level.Examples of these STXs included: Platoon Raids, Company Area Ambushes,Platoon Raid Live Fire (PRLF), and Company Cordon and Search.

Army Landing Craft Mediums (LCMs), LandingCraft Utility (LCUs), as well as CH-47, UH-60, and UH-1H helicopterswere utilized to insert, move and exfiltrate soldiers from the fieldduring week two.

Week three, the final week of training,consists of a comprehensive Field Training Exercise (FTX). The FTXbegins with and operations order (OPORD) issued from the brigadecommander (JOTB) to the rotational battalion commander. The rotationalbattalion then conducts troop leading procedures (TLP) necessary to planfor the upcoming mission. The battalion then deploys to the field forthree to five days. Again, different types of Army transportation assetsare utilized during week three.

The Jungle Warfare Course was repeated, ingenerally the same manner, eleven times during FY96.

The second course offered at the JOTB is theEngineer Jungle Warfare Course (EJWC). This four week course is brokendown into two weeks of field training for the rotational engineercompany and two weeks of troop construction (mission related) for FortSherman. The two weeks of training covers engineer related individual,squad and platoon tasks, what would be performed in a jungleenvironment.

The third course offered at the JOTB is theAir Crew Survival Course (ACS). Aircrews from Army aviation and AirForce units within Panama participate in the ACS, which is a ten (10)day event. In this course, up to 30 aircrew students learn basicsurvival techniques such as crossing water obstacles, land navigation,improvised tools and weapons, traps and snares, food procurement andpreparation, and escape and evasion. The training culminates in a fourday survival exercise designed to test the student’s ability to survivealone or in a small team should they find themselves in hostileterritory. The JOTB is seeking to expand this course and offer it topilots and crews world-wide.


HISTORY

BACKGROUND

America was embroiled in the Cold War and thebeginning of the Korean Conflict in April of 1951 when the CommandingGeneral of the U.S. Army, Caribbean was given the mission \"to keep theart of jungle warfare alive in the Army\". Recent worldwide eventsdemonstrated a need for proficiency in jungle operations. The Frenchwere struggling in the jungles of Indo-China against the Vietminh inhopes of reclaiming part of their pre Second World War empire. TheBritish were successfully fighting a counterinsurgency war in thejungles of Malaysia, and the U.S. had recently fought numerous bloodycampaigns in the tropics of the Burma-China-India Theater, and the SouthPacific during World War Two (WWII). Given America’s interests andresponsibilities as an emerging superpower, and our global focus, it waslikely the United States would again be called on to wage war in ajungle environment.




THE BEGINNINGS OF JUNGLE OPERATIONSAND TRAINING IN PANAMA

Until the Second World War, many militaryexperts believed that jungles were impenetrable and unsuitable formodern military operations. The successful Japanese attack on theBritish in Singapore through the Malaysian jungles in 1942 changedconventional thinking. However, American experiences in conductingtraining and maneuvers in the jungle began in 1916 with a cross PanamaIsthmus trek by a U.S. Army infantry detachment. The defense of thePanama Canal required U.S. forces to operate and train in the jungle;thus elements of the U.S. Army serving in Panama had fairly extensiveexperience in jungle survival and movement prior to U.S. participationin WWII. The Japanese defeat of British forces during the early years ofWWII caused an Army-wide examination of its ability to conductoperations in the jungle.

The Panama Mobile Force (PMF) was the primaryArmy element with experience in jungle operations. The PMF aggressivelypromoted their abilities to the War Department in order to secure a rolein America’s war effort. The PMF’s higher headquarters, the CaribbeanDefense Command (CDC) expanded training in jungle operations after beingtasked by the War Department to train 1500 replacements for the PacificTheater; training camps were established at Pacora and Rio Hato, Panama.The first sixty-day training cycle was completed on 15 March 1943. Whilethese sites provided valuable training, the terrain was not as ruggednor the vegetation as thick as that of most jungle in the Pacific.Another jungle training site was then established at Camp Pina, justsouth of Fort Sherman; the terrain at this site was as challenging asanything in the Pacific Theater. This site was used until the end of thewar.

Coincidentally, the most suitable area toconduct jungle warfare training under U.S. control at that time was CampPina (currently the Pina Range Complex) and Fort Sherman; the site ofcoastal artillery and anti-aircraft artillery batteries located on theAtlantic side of the Panama Canal. The Fort Sherman Military Reservationcovered an excess of fifty square miles of jungle and had an extensiveinfrastructure that included logistical and transportation systems. Thecombination of usable maneuver area and preexisting base facilities madeFort Sherman an ideal location for a jungle warfare school.

The Original Bushmasters This is the unitthat started jungle training in Panama.




FORTSHERMAN AREA

The areas used throughout the variousincarnations of the U.S. Army jungle warfare school include Fort Shermanand the Pina Range Complex. Fort Sherman Military Reservation isbordered to the North and North-West by the Caribbean Sea, on the Southand South-West by the Rio Chagres, and East by Limon Bay and Gatun Lake.It consists of 23,000 acres of single and double canopy jungle, which iscross-compartmentalized with steep rolling hills, numerous tributaries,mangrove swamps and coastline. The contonment area includes barracks andmess facilities, cadre headquarters and offices, a boathouse with docks,classroom and instruction sites, and recreation facilities. Trainingareas on the Fort Sherman Military Reservation include the maneuver areawith several fortified or semi-permanent objectives, a jungle landnavigation course, and jungle combat maneuver lanes, helicopter landingzones, a drop zone, and two coastal artillery batteries that have beenconverted into small arms ranges and special warfare training sites.

The Pina Range Complex is immediately Southof Fort Sherman, across the Rio Chagres. This complex includes severalsmall arms live fire ranges and maneuver lanes, a mortar maneuvercourse, a live fire village, and a demolitions range. White Drop Zoneand other areas of Gatun Lake are used for airborne insertions and smallboat operations. The Rio Chagres is also used for small boat andtactical riverine operations and as part of the Sapper (light combatengineer) live demolitions maneuver course.

The coastal artillery batteries andanti-aircraft gun emplacements on Fort Sherman were obsolete by themid-1940s; most of the large caliber guns had not been fired in years.Attack from the air was the major threat, and mobile anti-aircraft gunsand missiles, and motorized ground forces had replaced most of thestatic defenses of the Canal. This left Fort Sherman with a caretakergarrison and the primary mission to billet troops stationed on theAtlantic side of the Panama Canal. The change in mission was anotherfactor that made Fort Sherman a desirable location for jungle warfaretraining.




ORIGINS OF A FORMAL JUNGLE SCHOOL

The U.S. Army, Caribbean (USARCARIB) wasstill conducting limited jungle warfare and survival training for it’sforces, when they received the formal mission from the Department of theArmy of \"keeping the art of jungle warfare alive in the Army\" in Aprilof 1951. In compliance with this directive, USARCARIB issued TrainingMemorandum Number 9, which established a Jungle Warfare Training Board(JWTB). The JWTB was a study group \"responsible for continued researchand study, analysis, and reporting of final findings and recommendationson changes or additions to established U.S. Army doctrine and techniquesof jungle warfare and equipment designed for jungle operations.\"Standards of individual and unit jungle training were also established.One major result of the JWTB’s study was the establishment of aprovisional headquarters to plan, organize, and evaluate a 2,000 man,field training exercise. BRUSH BAY was conducted on Fort Sherman from 4May to 4 June 1953. Elements of the 33rd Infantry, the 370th EngineerAmphibious Support Regiment, and the 45th Reconnaissance Battalionstationed in Panama were joined by nearly 1,000 paratroopers from the82nd Airborne Division, organized in a Battalion Combat Team. Theprovisional HQ was replaced by the 7437th Army Unit, Jungle WarfareTraining Center (JWTC) on 15 June 1953; this was the origin of theJungle Operations Training Center (JOTC).

In November of 1953 the JWTC was attached tothe 33rd Infantry; its focus was to train Panama based soldiers injungle warfare and survival. Improvements were made to Fort Shermanfacilities, and formal training of the 33rd Infantry was begun in theSpring of 1954; the objective was to make the entire regiment proficientin jungle operations. In May of 1956 the 33rd Infantry was inactivated,and was replaced by the 20th Infantry Regiment, which inherited the JWTCand the mission of the 33rd Infantry.

The majority of soldiers trained by the JWTCwere from the Panama area, though CONUS based units were also beingtrained. An example of this was Exercise JUNGLE JIM, where a 1,200 manreinforced battalion combat team (2/188 AIR, 11th Airborne Division)received a month long (9 May to 7 June 1955) program of instruction(POI) and maneuvers very similar in scope of the POI used by the JOTC inthe 1990s. In December of 1957, the JWTC began regular cyclic trainingof units from outside of the Panama area as part of the recentlyreorganized 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry; this established the JungleOperations Course.

The JWTC normally ran ten, three week long,cycles annually. Specialized cycles (some were taught completely inSpanish for instance) and support of training exercises also occurred inaddition to the ten regular cycles. A normal cycle conducted training onthree levels, individual soldier skills, small unit, and company. Thebulk of the instruction was conducted for the infantry rifle company,but specialized training for a heavy weapons company, a heavy mortarcompany, a headquarters company, a combat engineer (Sapper) platoon, anda medical platoon was also available. Individual training includedjungle survival, camouflage, navigation, mines and boobytraps, andjungle plants and living. Upon completion of the \"core\" classes, thetraining focus shifted to small unit patrolling, attack, and ambushtactics and techniques. Once the small unit was proficient in jungleoperations, training moved to company and occasionally battalion leveloffensive field training exercises. By 1960 the JWTC had trained eleveninfantry battalions, one artillery battalion, nine infantry companies,one mortar battery, three provisional non-commissioned officer groups,and three provisional officer groups from the Continental United States(CONUS). Concurrent with these cycles, numerous soldiers from theUSARCARIB, LA Guardia National (Panamanian Police), numerous soldiersfrom Latin American countries, and American Special Warfare Unitsreceived jungle-specific training.

On 1 July 1963 the mission and functions ofthe JWTC were assumed by the Jungle Operations Committee (JOC) of theSchool of the Americas, based at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, Panama (theJOC continued to operate at Fort Sherman). Fort Gulick was locatedapproximately ten kilometers east of Fort Sherman, adjacent to the cityof Colon. The JOC extended the course to five weeks in duration, withthe emphasis in jungle survival skills, and less focus on tactics. Thereduction in tactical operations was mainly due to a shortage ofresources and trained cadre available from the School of the Americas.Fortunately, an influx of Special Forces qualified instructors andincreased supervision from the 8th Special Forces Group, in late 1965,brought fundamental changes to the program of instruction. The coursewas shortened to two weeks in length, most of which was spent in thejungle, and the training focus returned to combat tactics, techniques,and procedures.




VIETNAM AND JUNGLE WARFARE TRAINING

Although highly beneficial to the survivaland combat effectiveness of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia, the JungleOperations Committee remained fairly low profile throughout the early1960s. However as American involvement in Southeast Asia increased, sodid the importance and utilization of the JOC. An example of thisincrease is number of students who graduated from the course. In FY1961, about 1700 students graduated from the course; 9145 studentsgraduated in FY 1967. One of the major reasons for this increase was theparticipation of 60 officers and non-commissioned officers from the 1stCavalry Division (Airmobile) in July of 1966. Extensive positiveresponse about the value of instruction was quickly brought to theattention of LTG Creighton Abrams, the U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff.Soon the Department of the Army (DA) increased the quota of trainees forthe JOC, and agreed to increase instructors and funds late in 1967. Arapid increase in class size and number of two week cycles occurredbefore additional funds and manpower was provided by DA; one of the JOCshigher headquarters, U.S. Army South (USARSO) was tasked to provideadditional resources in the interim.

The Jungle Operations Committee continuallytook measures to improve the quality of instruction. In addition toconducting course after action reviews, the JOC sent questionnaires toofficers and NCOs that deployed to Vietnam about 90 days after they hadbeen in country; this questionnaire asked for a reappraisal of coursecurriculum based on their experiences (see Appendix C). The commentaryreceived was very positive overall, but valuable suggestions were madethat led to modifications in the course. In October 1965 a team from theUSARSO G3 visited a jungle operations course being taught in Hawaii. ThePOI was similar to the Panama jungle operations course, but the Hawaiicourse included a cordon and search of a mock Vietnamese village; thiswas added to the Panamanian course. This program of cadre/instructorself-critique and rotational unit after-action reviews (with the goal ofconstantly refining the Jungle Operations Course) continued until theschool was closed in 1999.




JUNGLEOPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER DEVELOPMENT

The Jungle Operations Committee, of theSchool of the Americas was separated by the Department of the Army on 1July 1968, and became the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC). TheJOTC was placed under operational control of the 8th Special ForcesGroup on 1 July 1970. In July of 1975 the JOTC became an independentmajor subordinate command within the 193rd Infantry Brigade. These wereprimarily administrative moves, with little impact on the content of theJungle Operations Course. The school did receive other responsibilitiesin addition to running the JOC; a USARSO RECONDO course was establishedin March of 1969, and operation of the USARSO NCO academy was given tothe JOTC in October 1971.

The Jungle Operations Course was three weekslong throughout the early 1970’s with minor alterations in the POI; mostof these were caused by technological improvements in night visionoptics and heliborne mobility. Slots to the JOTC were given primarily toCONUS based light and airborne battalions. Slots were still allocated toindividual soldiers in a manner similar to Airborne School. Organicunits such as a squad from 1-504 Parachute Infantry Regiment did notattend the course. Soldiers from throughout the Army came to JOTC andwere assigned to a provisional squad / platoon for the duration of thecourse. The jungle warfare skills learned and the opportunity for NCOsto test their leadership was undoubtedly very valuable, but a majorchange initiated in the mid-1970s vastly improved the benefits gainedfrom attendance.

The Jungle Operations Training Center wasreorganized in Fiscal Year 1976 to train battalion sized units. Thebasic POI was still taught, but soldiers now attended all training withmembers of their organic teams, squads, and platoons. This did much toimprove unit teambuilding and to enhance leadership skills of juniorNCOs and officers. After core week training, platoons went throughsituational training exercises (STX) where squad and platoon leaderswere placed in difficult tactical situations. These exercises, inaddition to live fire ambushes and react to contact maneuver courses,honed the warfighting skills and esprit of the small unit. The thirdweek added company and battalion level operations during a battalion ledfield training exercise (FTX). The FTX exercised the battalion commandgroup, the battalion staff, and company leadership. Units experiencedthe challenges of command, control and logistics in the jungle. Theoverall benefits of a rotation to the JOTC were now battalion wide andcovered almost all of the Battle Operating Systems. Rotations weresought after throughout the Army light infantry community and the MarineCorps. Additionally, many Special Operations units received trainingfrom JOTC instructors or used JOTC facilities while conducting internaltraining events.




OPERATION JUST CAUSE

The unit that operated the Jungle OperationsTraining Center was redesignated the Jungle Operations TrainingBattalion (JOTB) during the invasion of Panama in December 1989. Thebattalion was notified of possible contingency operations as tensionsbetween the American and Panamanian governments increased, and preparedand trained accordingly. The JOTB was augmented with additional combatand combat support assets and as JUST CAUSE began, was designated TaskForce Sherman. The task force served with the 3rd Brigade, 7th InfantryDivision (Light) as part of Task Force Atlantic.

Task Force Sherman successfully maintainedthe security and defense of Fort Sherman and the Gatun Locks complex,including numerous key communications and transportation facilities, theGatun Locks, dam, spillway bridge, and hydroelectric plant. The TaskForce also cleared and 27 towns and villages, and 140 kilometers ofcoastline. They conducted 19 air assaults and Civilian MilitaryOperations in four villages. Patrols from Task Force Sherman eliminatedall Hunter Platoons south of the Rio Chagres, captured numerousprisoners of war, weapons, and large amounts of ammunition andequipment. They cleared the town of Portobello, Isla Grande and othervillages located north of Colon during a joint operation with Navy SEALsand Special Operations Aviation. Patrols continued until 12 January1990, when Task Force Sherman became the reserve for Task ForceAtlantic. The Jungle Operations Training Battalion was awarded a battlestreamer for its actions during Operation JUST CAUSE, making it the onlyTDA unit in the U.S. Army to receive this distinction.




THE JOTB IN THE 1990’s

The JOTB returned to its primary mission oftraining light infantry units in the art of jungle warfare afterOperation JUST CAUSE. By 1992, twelve light infantry jungle warfarecourses, four engineer jungle warfare courses, and four aircrew survivalcourses were taught annually. In addition to these standard rotations,the JOTB provided support to numerous Special Operations units, U.S.Government, and law enforcement agencies.

The JOTB fulfilled a critical role in theU.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and USARSO military-to-militaryexchange programs (which included small unit exchanges, and guestinstructor programs) that enhanced relations and aided our efforts toinfluence the further democratization of the Americas. Countries thatparticipated in these programs included Argentina, Brazil, Chile,Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The Jungle Warfare Course (JWC) was threeweeks in duration and trained light infantry battalion task forces injungle operations. The first week (core week) of training consisted ofindividual soldier skills and squad collective tasks that would beperformed in a jungle environment. These tasks included: jungle plantsand living, land navigation, mines and boobytraps, jungle combattechniques, waterborne operations, and squad react to contact live firelanes. Scout, mortar, and combat engineer (Sapper) platoons receivedadditional specialized training during core week. The second weekconsisted of situational training exercises (STX) which included platoondeliberate attacks, raids, ambushes, a company cordon and search, andSapper, riverine demolition missions. A battalion field trainingexercise (FTX) was conducted during the third and final week of the JWC.This FTX was normally a four-day long, free-play exercise that pittedthe training battalion against a company-sized opposition force (OPFOR).JOTB observer/controllers provided both the training battalion and theOPFOR company with continuous response through comprehensive afteraction reviews.

The Engineer Jungle Warfare Course (EJWC) wassimilar in nature to the JWC, with additional focus on demolitions andmobility operations. The core week instruction was the same as the JWC,with the second week consisting of a four day FTX that required Sapperplatoons to conduct numerous combat patrols, engineer reconnaissancemissions, and route clearance missions on the Chagres River and jungletrails using live demolitions to reduce obstacles. The Sapper companywould perform construction missions during the third and fourth weeks.These missions included basic masonry, carpentry, and pioneer tasks. Therepair or replacement of foot bridges in the jungle, repair of boatdocks, and construction of training sites are examples of some EJWCprojects.

The Air Crew Survival Course (ACS) wasapproximately two weeks in duration, and trained Army and Air Forceaircrew personnel, U.S. Government, and law enforcement agencies inbasic survival, escape and evasion techniques. Subjects includedcrossing water obstacles, improvised tools, weapons, traps, and snares,food procurement and preparation, and jungle navigation. The courseculminated in a four day survival, escape, and evasion exercise designedto test the student’s ability to survive alone or in small groups, whilein hostile territory.

Due to the Army drawing down after OperationDESERT STORM, there were only two light infantry divisions, one airassault division, and one airborne division left on active duty.Numerous low-intensity conflicts and sustainment and stabilityoperations in Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans showed the need for skilledlight fighters. Many of the battalions that participated in theseoperations had gone through a JOTC rotation. The environmentalexperience from the conduct of jungle operations was not the onlybenefit gained from training at the JOTC. Teambuilding, the focus onsmall unit combat operations and numerous live fire exercises, honed thecritical combat skills of many battalions that participated in theseoperations.

The value of a JOTC rotation was recognizedby all echelons of the \"light fighter\" community, from divisioncommanders to team leaders. Infantry and Combat Engineer units from allCONUS based active Army, light, airborne, and air assault divisions, the75th Ranger Regiment, and the United States Marine Corps continued tocompete for course rotations to the JOTB until its inactivation in 1999.


U.S. ARMYJUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING BATTALION Fort Sherman wasnamed by the War Department on 24 November 1911, in honor of GeneralWilliam Tecumseh Sherman. The mission of Fort Sherman through World WarII was to provide a defense for the Atlantic port of Cristobal and theGatun Locks. This defense, provided by Coastal Artillery, consisted ofBatteries Mower, Stanley, Kilpatrick, Howard, Baird, Pratt and McKenzie,each of which housed either coastal guns or mortars. From 1946 to 1948,Fort Sherman served primarily to billet troops assigned to the Caribbeanside of the isthmus. In April 1951, the Department of the Army assignedthe U.S. Army Caribbean the mission of \"keeping the art of junglewarfare alive in the Army.\" In compliance with this directive aprovisional headquarters was established to conduct \"Exercise Brush Bay\"on the Fort Sherman Military Reservation. From this small beginning grewthe groundwork for the U.S. Army’s Jungle Training School. The growth ofthe jungle school was not a rapid one. After operation \"Brush Bay,\" theheadquarters was disbanded, but the 7437th Army Unit was activated tocare for the maneuver area and was attached to the 33rd InfantryRegiment. The facilities at Fort Sherman were improved in 1954, as unitsfrom the 33rd Infantry Regiment were being trained. The objective ofthis training was to make the entire regiment completely proficient injungle operations. In May 1956, the 33rd Infantry was deactivated andreplaced by the 20th Infantry Regiment, which inherited the mission ofconducting jungle warfare training. Under this regiment, reorganized inDecember 1957 as the 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry, cycle training wasconducted for military personnel outside the Panama area. Normally, tentraining cycles, each three weeks in duration, were programmed annually.On 1 July 1963, the jungle school\'s mission and functions were assumedby the Jungle Operations Committee (JOC) of the newly redesignated U.S.Army School of the Americas, Fort Gulick, Canal Zone. Later, on 1 July1968, the United States Army Jungle Operations Training Center (USAJOTC)was established to carry on the mission of training soldiers to conductoperations in a jungle environment. On 1 July 1970, the JOTC was placedunder the operational control of the 8th Special Forces Group (Abn). InJuly 1975, the USAJOTC was designated an independent major subordinatecommand under the 193rd Infantry Brigade. In 1976, JOTC began thetransition from an individual training center to a unit training center.Finally in January 1989, the unit which operates the JOTC becamedesignated as the Jungle Operations Training Battalion (JOTB). The JOTBparticipated in \"Operation JUST CAUSE\" (December 1989 - January 1990) aspart of Task Force SHERMAN, operationally controlled by Task ForceATLANTIC, The JOTB participated in \"Operation JUST CAUSE\" (December 1989- January 1990) as part of Task Force SHERMAN, operationally controlledby Task Force ATLANTIC, 3rd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light). TheJOTB conducted successful security and defense missions of Fort Shermanand the Gatun Locks Complex; cleared and secured 27 towns and villagesand 140 kilometers of coastline; conducted 19 separate air assaultoperations; conducted civil-military operations in 4 towns and villages;eliminated the threat from the \"Hunter Platoons\" south of the RioChagres and captured numerous enemy prisoners, weapons and large amountsof munitions and military equipment. For its contributions during\"Operation JUST CAUSE\", JOTB was awarded a battle streamer, the only TDAunit in the U.S. Army to receive this distinction. In December 1991,FORSCOM approved a rotation cycle reduction from 15 to 12 light infantryjungle warfare courses, 4 engineer warfare courses and 4 aircrewsurvival courses annually. Continued modifications to the TDA haveallowed the JOTB to evolve over the past four years into the premiertraining center for keeping the \"art of jungle warfare alive in theArmy\". This includes: increasing efforts to train Latin American alliedarmed forces as part of an overall regional military to military contactprogram; enhancing the realism of training by incorporating civiliansinto the battlefield; adding new live fire exercises; improving theinstructor certification program and revalidating the flexible programsof instruction for units attending the training. In August 1994, JOTBwas designated a dependent restricted tour area due to theimplementation of the 1977 Treaty Implementation Plan. By October 1994,families were no longer allowed to be assigned on Fort Sherman.Beginning in the summer of 1995, transitioning efforts commenced on theAtlantic side of Panama which resulted in the closure of Fort Davis andFort Espinar on 1 September 1995. This left Fort Sherman and the JOTB asthe only significant U.S. presence on the Atlantic side of Panama.Steady efforts to improve the quality of life on Fort Sherman since theclosure of Fort Davis and Espinar continued through FYs 96 and 97.


EJWC
The Engineer Jungle WarfareCourse

By Captain Andrew V. Jasaitis

The Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC),located at Fort Sherman, Panama, trains infantry battalions and engineercompanies to conduct jungle combat operations. One of the programsoffered by JOTC is the Engineer Jungle Warfare Course (EJWC).

The EJWC provides a unique opportunity forengineer companies and platoons to train in a jungle environment. TheJungle Operations Training Battalion normally supports four engineercompany and ten engineer platoon rotations annually. The EJWC is open toalmost any combat engineer company-airborne, air assault, wheeled,combat support equipment, combat heavy, etc. Most rotations are fromcorps-level engineer companies because divisional engineer platoonsdeploy and train with the Infantry Battalion Jungle Warfare Courserotations.

The Jungle Operations Training Center\'sprimary objective is to keep the art of jungle warfare alive in the Armytoday. In concert with this mission, the Engineer Jungle Warfare Courseprepares engineers to fight future battles and win in a jungleenvironment.

In addition to supporting U.S. Army combatengineers, the Engineer Jungle Warfare Course provides joint training toselected U.S. Marine Corps engineer platoons and some Latin Americanengineers.


Program of Instruction

The program of instruction for the EJWC isorganized, manned, and equipped to provide training to three engineerplatoons. Instructors from Alpha Company, Jungle Operations TrainingBattalion, conduct the training by committees. Team 6 providesinstruction in engineer-specific tasks.
The four-week EJWC consists of two weeks ofcombat training (core jungle training and tactical operations) and twoweeks of construction (Army Facilities Components System-Tropical).

Combat Training. Typical training during thefirst two weeks includes: jungle living, land navigation, mines andbooby traps, jungle combat techniques, rappelling, advanced rigging andhauling, squad reconnaissance, squad react-to-contact (blank and livefire), waterborne and small-boat operations, basic and advanceddemolitions, and platoon reconnaissance and demolition missions.Platoons also negotiate the rugged \"Green Hell\" obstacle course. Thesecond week culminates in a two-day company field training exercisedesigned to meet the unit\'s mission essential task list (METL) trainingneeds and to employ tactics, techniques, and procedures learned duringcore training. Company infiltration and movement is by severalmethods-landing craft, medium (LCM); F-470 Zodiacs, or Army aviation(air assault).

Construction Training. The third and fourthweeks of the course are spent on construction missions, which includecarpentry, concrete and masonry, plumbing, and construction managementtasks. Projects include bridge repair or replacement; target, rappeltower, obstacle, boat dock, fence, cage, and roof construction; officeand classroom renovation; and window installation. Units normallyprovide eight days of construction effort. All projects are designed tosupport the training center so that the Jungle Operations TrainingBattalion can continue to provide high quality training opportunities.


OLD Army Article:
Rangers get jungle training to help preparefor exercises

Sgt. Marc Turchin

FORT SHERMAN, Panama, (Army News Service,April 10, 1998) -- Soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regimentfinished their first week of training consisting of a series of jungletraining classes to prepare them for their upcoming field trainingexercises.

The classes included mines and booby traps,waterborne operations; squad react to contacts, jungle living and landnavigation.

\"The classes gave the ranger combateffectiveness for him and the unit,\" said Sgt. 1st Class Kenneth Wolfe,Jungle Operations Training Center instructor at one of the react tocontact training sites.

The mines and booby traps class had therangers learning about what types of mines and traps are found in jungleterrain. They were also shown the correct way of walking through theterrain and how to spot the mines and traps. Following a short class,platoons were given a mission, which included azimuths and amounts ofdistance each platoon was expected to travel.

The terrain had the platoons moving throughthick vegetation, crossing over streams and climbing up and down hills.Some platoons found mines and traps while others bypassed themaltogether. Cadre members said the idea was to see if the rangers couldmaneuver through the terrain properly and react to exploding trainingtraps and mines correctly.

\"It pretty much made us aware of what\'s outthere and what to look for,\" said Staff Sgt. John Donaldson, battalionreenlistment NCO. He said he learned about American made and foreignmade traps and mines.

\"Foreign countries have different set upsthan ours,\" he said. \"Basically, anything in the jungle could be boobytrapped.\"

From booby traps to boats, rangers tookclasses on just about everything in between. Waterborne operationsstarted with a swim test. Donaldson said this was done to ensureeveryone was capable of conducting the training. After the swim test,the rangers learned the correct way of getting out of a parachute whilein the water. Each ranger went under water with the parachute attachedand was required to unhook himself.

The soldiers then moved from the water toland to practice tying the proper knots needed for this type oftraining. Rangers stood in square configurations as waterborneinstructors first demonstrated the tying procedures then watched as therangers gave the knot tying a shot. When the knot tying class wasfinished, rangers moved to preparing their rucksacks for water carriage.

The rucks were wrapped in watertight packagesusing ponchos. Each ranger was required to swim between 100 and 200meters with the ruck attached to them. They also had to build ponchorafts with their rucksacks. Rangers swam in two-man teams with tworucksacks. The front man was attached to the rucks with a snap link andpulled the rafts as he swam while the back person pushed the rucks.

The waterborne class also saw the rangerslearning to build rope bridges and then cross them. Using six orseven-man squads, rangers put their newly acquired skills to use as theyfirst set up the rope bridges on land to practice the procedure. Theynext had to do the same across a 25-meter water obstacle. The squadsused three lanes to set up their rope bridges.

After accomplishing the task at hand, therangers conducted a competition to get back to where they started. Thestakes had the second place squad doing 25 push-ups and the third placesquad knocking out 50. But the rangers weren\'t through getting wet.

Next was boat operations. They were given aclass about how to capsize a zodiac boat. Donaldson said the main reasonfor capsizing the boat has to do with the jungle environment.

\"One of the reasons we\'d have to capsize theboat would be due to heavy rains,\" he said. \"We\'d have to get the waterout of the boat.\" To capsize the boat, the rangers have to go through aseries of commands. \"I\'d have to say waterborne was the best of all theclasses,\" Donaldson said. \"It\'s been a couple of years since I lasttrained with the boats,\" he said. \"Plus it gave mea chance to swimaround a little bit.\"

Donaldson described himself as a strongswimmer on the ranger swimming scale -- a less experienced swimmer is anon-swimmer, an average swimmer is called a swimmer and an experiencedswimmer is called a strong swimmer.

No matter how well the soldier could swim;the squad-react-to-contact class had the rangers totally submerged injungle terrain testing how well each squad acted under fire from anenemy. This class also offered the rangers something most said theylooked forward to -- their first live-fire in the deployment.

Rangers first moved as squads through thejungle with their weapons loaded with blanks. An opposing forceeventually ambushed the squad. Wolfe, who accompanied all squads at histraining lane through the movement, said he was watching for good andbad actions. Whether the squad did well or bad, Wolfe discussed allaspects of the mission during the after action review.

After one AAR, Wolfe said there\'s somethingspecial about working with rangers.

\"They\'re at a higher level of trainingcompared to other light Infantry units,\" he said. \"Being that I spenttime in the regiment, I know they\'re whole life is centered aroundtraining.\"

One Soldier said training in the jungle islike training nowhere else. \"It makes it tougher to control yourelement,\" said Staff Sgt. Richard Clinton, squad leader with Company B,3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. \"You can\'t see as well and you haveto tighten things up and slow everything down.\"

Although Clinton admitted most of his squadhad never operated in the jungle, he said practice makes perfect.\"They\'re getting a lot out of this,\" he said. \"As they do it, they getmore and more confident and that\'s the big thing with this -- buildingtheir confidence.\"

Clinton said his squad did react well on itsfirst time through, but it\'s an educating experience. \"In anything wedo, there\'s going to be learning points,\" he said. \"That\'s the reasonwe\'re out here training.\"

The training continued at the jungle livingclass. Here, rangers were introduced to habitats of the jungle. Theywatched as cadre showed slides at the post theater of animals and plantlife the soldiers may run into while training in the jungle. Forinstance, Donaldson said he was worried about a certain frog thatsecretes a poisonous liquid out of its glands when it is agitated. \"Youhave to be on your toes all the time,\" he said. \"There\'s a lot of stuffthat can mess you up.\"

The rangers also walked through the post zoo,located near their barracks. There they saw crocodiles and a variety ofmonkeys and birds. All call Panama home.

Some of that wildlife may have been seenduring the land navigation course. Unlike the courses on Fort Benning,Donaldson said the maps don\'t show the small terrain features because ofthe rainy season.

\"The rainy season changes the way the terrainlooks and that effected us getting to our second point.\" He said thefirst point was found pretty easily, but the second one took a whilebecause his squad was basing their direction on pace count and terrainfeatures. \"We got disorientated at first, then found a spot on the mapwhere we thought we were and 15 minutes later we found our point.\"

Donaldson and a number of other soldiersblamed the terrain for their misfortunes. \"You\'re fighting vinesconstantly,\" Donaldson said. \"Visibility was no more than about 20meters at best.\" The soldiers were required to find three of four pointsin less than three hours.

In the end, the classes are designed toprepare the rangers for their field exercises during the second week ofthe deployment. But, Clinton said this type of training has otherbenefits.

\"We\'re out there doing raids, ambushes,movement to contacts, running patrol bases and moving from here tothere,\" he said. \"It\'s good learning for everyone -- especially theyounger guys who still need to go to Ranger School.\"

(Editor\'s note: Turchin is a writer with theU.S. Army Infantry Center and Fort Benning public affairs office at FortBenning, Ga.)



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