WW II US Navy Sterling Silver Gold Plate Pin Back Submariner Badge Full Size For Sale

WW II US Navy Sterling Silver Gold Plate Pin Back Submariner Badge Full Size
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WW II US Navy Sterling Silver Gold Plate Pin Back Submariner Badge Full Size:
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PLEASE SEE STORELOT MORE --COMBINE SHIPPINGSAVE $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$Allied submarines in the Pacific WarJapanese freighterNittsu Marusinks after being torpedoed byUSSWahooon 21 March 1943.

Alliedsubmarineswere used extensively during thePacific Warand were a key contributor to the defeat of theEmpire of Japan.

During the war, submarines of theUnited States Navywere responsible for 56% of Japan'smerchant marinelosses; other Allied navies added to the toll.[1]The war against shipping was the single most decisive factor in the collapse of the Japanese economy. Allied submarines also sank a large number ofImperial Japanese Army(IJA) troop transports, killing many thousands of Japanese soldiers and hampering the deployment of IJA reinforcements during the battles on the Pacific islands.

They also conducted reconnaissance patrols, landedspecial forcesandguerrillatroops and performedsearch and rescuetasks.[2]The majority of the submarines involved were from the U.S. Navy, with the BritishRoyal Navycommitting the second largest number of boats and theRoyal Netherlands Navycontributing smaller numbers of boats.

The Allied submarine campaign is one of the least-publicized feats inmilitary history,[1]in large part because of the efforts of Allied governments to ensure their own submarines' actions were not reported in the media. The U.S. Navy adopted an official policy ofunrestricted submarine warfare, and it appears the policy was executed without the knowledge or prior consent of the government.[3]TheLondon Naval Treaty, to which the U.S. was signatory,[4]required submarines to aoffere byprize rules(commonly known as "cruiser rules"). It did not prohibit arming merchantmen,[5]but arming them, or having them report contact with submarines (orraiders), made themde factonaval auxiliaries and removed the protection of the cruiser rules.[6]This made restrictions on submarines effectively moot.[5]

A major reason why the U.S. submarine campaign is little known is the defectiveMark 14andMark 15torpedoes. They were mass produced without adequate testing during development, leaving four major engineering faults and only a 20% success rate from December 1941 to late 1943. For those two years U.S. submarines struggled to sink any Japanese warships or merchant ships. For example, during the1941-42 Philippines campaignthe United States Navy'sAsiatic Fleet's23 modern state-of-the-art submarines failed to sink a single Japanese warship even when scoring direct hits, because the torpedoes all failed to explode for myriad style="margin: 0.5em 0px 0px; padding-bottom: 0.5em;">The U.S. had the largest and most powerful submarine force of all the Allied countries in the Pacific at the outbreak of war.[citation needed]Pre-war U.S. Navy doctrine—like that of all major navies—specified that the main role of submarines was to support the surface fleet by conducting reconnaissance and attacking large enemy warships. Merchant ships were regarded as secondary targets, and the circumstances in which they could be attacked were greatly limited byprize rulesset out in theLondon Naval Treaty, to which the U.S. was a signatory. The U.S. Navy built large submarines which boasted long range, a relatively fast cruising speed and a heavy armament oftorpedoes. United States submarines were better suited for long patrols in the tropics than those of the other major powers due to amenities such asair conditioning(which GermanU-boats, for instance, lacked) and fresh waterdistillationunits.[citation needed]The submarines' commanders and crewmen were considered elite and enjoyed a strongesprit de corps.[9]On 7 December 1941, the USN had 55fleet- and 18 medium-sized submarines (S-boats) in the Pacific, 38 submarines elsewhere, and 73 under construction.[10](By war's end, the U.S. had completed 228 submarines.)[11]

WhileBritainstationed a force of submarines in the Far East prior to the outbreak of war, no boats were available in December 1941. The British had 15 modern submarines in the Far East in September 1939. These submarines formed part of theChina Stationand were organised into the 4th Flotilla. Although the number of British submarines in the Far East increased in early 1940 when the 8th Flotilla arrived atCeylon, bothflotillasand all their submarines were withdrawn in mid-1940 to reinforce theMediterranean Fleet.[12]

TheNetherlandsalso maintained a submarine force in the Far East in order to protect theNetherlands East Indies(NEI). In December 1941, this force comprised 15 boats based atSurabaya, most of which were obsolete.[13][14]

Strategic implications[edit]

Throughout the war, Japan was dependent on sea transport to provide adequate resources, including food, to thehome islandsand supply its military at garrisons across the Pacific. Before the war, Japan estimated the nation required 5,900,000long tons(6,000,000t) of shipping to maintain the domestic economy and military during a major war. At the time of theattack on Pearl HarborJapan's shipping capacity was much greater than that, totaling 7,600,000 long tons (7,700,000t) of shipping: the Japanese merchant fleet was capable of 6,400,000 long tons (6,500,000t), and smaller craft were capable of an additional 1,200,000 long tons (1,200,000t).[15]

At the start of the war, the U.S. submarine fleet was ineffective, for multiple reasons:[16]

    A high proportion of the submarines deployed against the Japanese were obsolete.
  • U.S. boats were hampered by defects in their primary weapon, theMark 14 torpedo.
  • Poor training led to an excessive reliance onsonar.
  • Skippers were insufficiently aggressive,[17]and they exhibited an undue fear ofdestroyers' sonar and aircraft.[18]
  • Poor dispositions – the fleet were scattered on close surveillance of Japan's major bases.[19]
  • Command was divided, which kept submarines out of one of the best hunting areas, theLuzon Strait, for fear offriendly fire.[20]

Despite an awareness that shipping was vital, the Japanese military seriously underestimated the (eventual) threat from Allied submarines. This overconfidence was reinforced by the ineffectiveness of Allied submarines in the early part of the war.[21]Anti-submarine warfarewas accorded a low priority and few warships and aircraft were allocated to protecting merchant shipping.[22]Japanese destroyers formed the bulk of convoy protection; they had impressive night fighting capabilities, but had deficiencies in sonar and radar compared to equivalents of other navies.[23]Moreover,Japanese Navydoctrine in relation tocommerce defensewas very bad.[24]

The size and effectiveness of the Allied submarine force increased greatly during the Pacific War. The U.S. increased production of modern submarines from 1942 onward. The efforts of AdmiralCharles A. Lockwoodwere crucial for the rectification of the Mark 14's problems (which were nevertheless not resolved until September 1943).[16]He also selected more aggressive submarine skippers.Signals intelligencebroke the "marucode" in January 1943, after a gaffe by U.S. Customs pre-war had caused Japan to change it,[25]and American aircraft engaged in aerialminelayinginOperation Starvation. As a result of all of these developments, U.S. submarines inflicted devastating losses on Japanese merchant shipping in 1943 and 1944, and by January 1945 had effectively destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet.[26]

Poor torpedoes claimed at least two U.S. submarines[27]out of 48 lost on patrol.[28]

Countering the Japanese offensive[edit]Torpedoed Japanese destroyerYamakazephotographed through the periscope of American submarineUSSNautiluson 25 June 1942.This sectionneeds expansion. You can help byadding to it.(June 2008)

In a break with pre-war doctrine (which, like Japan's, had presumed a rush across the Pacific and a"decisive battle"betweenbattleships),[29]with the London Naval Treaty, and with long-standing U.S. defense offreedom of the seas, U.S. naval commanders in the Pacific were ordered by the U.S. Navy Chief of Staff to "execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan" on the afternoon of 7 December 1941, six hours after the Japanese attack.[30]This order authorized all U.S. submarines in the Pacific to attack and sink any warship, commercial vessel, or civilian passenger ship flying the Japanese flag, without warning.Thomas C. Hart, commander in chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, issued the same order at 03:45 Manila time (09:15 in Hawaii, 14:45 in DC) on his own initiative (but knowing U.S. Navy Chief of OperationsHarold "Betty" Starkintended to do so).[31]

ThePacific Fleetsubmarine force had emerged unscathed from the attack on Pearl Harbor andUSSGudgeondeparted on the fleet's first offensive war patrol on 11 December. TheAsiatic Fleet's 27 submarines (including more fleet boats than at Pearl Harbor)[32]also went into action on the first day of U.S. involvement in the war, beginning war patrols in the waters around thePhilippinesandIndochina.[33]Due to inadequate prewar planning, which made no provision for defensiveminelaying,[34]nor for placing submarines on station around the Philippines,[35]nor off enemy harbors,[36]the Asiatic Fleet's efforts to counter theJapanese invasion of the Philippineswere unsuccessful and the fleet's surviving submarines were forced to withdraw to Surabaya in theDutch East Indies(DEI).[37]

British, and U.S. submarines took part inthe unsuccessful defense of British Malayaand the DEI in late 1941 and early 1942. In December 1941, five Dutch submarines attacked the Japanese invasion fleetoff Malaya. These submarines sank two Japanese merchant ships and damaged four others, but three of the attackers were sunk. The two surviving Dutch submarines were withdrawn to defend the DEI where they were assisted by two British submarines, which had been transferred from theMediterranean Fleet, and several U.S. boats.[38]The U.S. Asiatic Fleet's submarine force left Surabaya forFremantle, Western Australia, on 1 March. (They would remain in Australia, on the most hazardous and unproductive stations for U.S. submarines, for the duration.)[32]By this date, the Asiatic Fleet's 27 submarines had sunk 12 Japanese ships for the loss of four U.S. boats.[39]Following the fall of the DEI, only a handful of British and Dutch submarines were based in theIndian Ocean, and these had little impact on Japanese forces in the area.[40]

War of attrition[edit]This sectionneeds expansion. You can help byadding to it.(June 2008)

After theBattle of the Coral Sea, the U.S. Navy detached eight submarines to finish off the damagedaircraft carrierShōkaku, but she evaded all of them. At theBattle of Midway, although the attack on thebattleshipKirishimabyUSSNautilushad been unsuccessful, it drew the destroyerArashitemporarily away from the main fleet to drop depth charges, and the destroyer's return was traced byUSSEnterprise'sVB-6to the Japanese task force, where the dive bombers promptly set on fire the fleet in 1942, U.S. submarines had managed to sink theheavy cruiserKakoand thelight cruiserTenryū.

As a result of several key improvements the previous year, U.S. submarines inflicted tremendous losses to the heavy units of the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1944. They destroyed the Japanese fleet carriersShōkakuandTaihōin theBattle of the Philippine Sea, and sank or disabled threeTakao-classcruisers at the start of theBattle of Leyte Gulf. Also sunk that year were the battleshipKongō(being the only Japanese battleship lost to a submarine), the escort carriersShin'yō,TaiyōandUn'yō, and the fleet carriersUnryuandShinano, the latter being the largest vessel ever sunk by a submarine.

From 1943, Allied submarines waged an increasingly effective campaign against Japanese merchant shipping and the IJN. By the end of the war in August 1945, the Japanese merchant marine had less than a quarter of the tonnage it had in December 1941. Overall, U.S. Navy submarines sank around 1,300 Japanese merchant ships, as well as roughly 200 warships.[44]Despite the need to maintain sea lanes for its empire, the Japanese never successfully developed a cost-effectivedestroyer escortbetter suited for convoy duties, while it also did not have the industrial might to replace the losses of its heavily armed destroyers,[45][46]nor of its ill-protected merchantmen.

In 1943, U.S. Congressman Andrew J. Mayrevealed the factthat Japanese depth charges were not set deep enough to destroy U.S. submarines. While it has never been definitively established that May's disclosure actually prompted the Japanese to augment their strategy,[47]Japanese anti-submarine warfare grew in effectiveness, particularly after the debut of radar in the IJN.[citation needed]

British and Dutch submarine operations[edit]

The British submarine force in the Far East was greatly expanded from August 1943 onward. The BritishEastern Fleetwas responsible for submarine operations in th of Bengal,Strait of Malaccaas far as Singapore, and the western coast ofSumatrato the Equator. Few large Japanese cargo ships operated in this area, and the British submarines' main targets were small craft operating in inshore waters.[48]The submarines were deployed to conduct reconnaissance, interdict Japanese supplies travelling toBurma, and attack U-boats operating from Penang. The Eastern Fleet's submarine force continued to expand during 1944, and by October 1944 had sunk a cruiser, three submarines, six small naval vessels, 40,000 long tons (41,000t) of merchant ships, and nearly 100 small vessels.[49]

The British submarine force expanded its areas of operation in the last months of the war. In late 1944, the 8th Flotilla—with 11 British and Dutch submarines—was transferred to Fremantle and operated in theJava Seaand surrounding areas under the command of theU.S 7th Fleet. The 4th Flotilla and the newly formed 2nd Flotilla remained at Ceylon.

By March 1945, British boats had gained control of the Strait of Malacca, preventing any supplies from reaching the Japanese forces in Burma by sea. By this time, there were few large Japanese ships in the region, and the submarines mainly operated against small ships which they attacked with their deck guns.

In April the 8th Flotilla moved toSubic Bayin the Philippines and the 4th Flotilla replaced it at Fremantle. At this time, there were 38 British and Dutch submarines in the theater, and an additional five boats on their way from Europe. The submarineHMSTrenchanttorpedoed and sank the heavy cruiserAshigarain theBangka Strait, taking down some 1,200 Japanese army troops.

Three British submarines were sunk by the Japanese during the war:HMSStratagem,HMSPorpoise, andHMSStonehenge(which wasmined).[50]

Merchant shipping losses[edit]

Different sources provide varying figures for the size of the Japanese merchant marine and its wartime losses.

Size of the Japanese merchant fleet during World War II(all figures in tons)[51]

DateAdditionsLossesNet changeEnd of – style="margin: 0.5em 0px 0px; padding-bottom: 0.5em;">Japanese merchant fleet losses during World War II(all figures in tons, taken fromJANAC)[52]

DateStarting tonnageAdditionsLossesNet changeEnd of period
total1942 (including of war-3,903,0001,983,000

One Japanese reference reports 15,518 civilian ships lost.[53]JANAC reports 2,117 Japanese merchant ships lost with a total tonnage of 7,913,858 long tons (8,040,851t) and 611 IJN ships lost with a total tonnage of 1,822,210 long tons (1,851,450t).[54]

Attacks on IJA troopships and hell ships[edit]

In addition to taking a heavy toll on Japan's merchant shipping, a large number oftroopshipswere also sunk. This resulted in the loss of thousands of Japanese troops, who were being transported to bolster Japan's already declining manpower on land in the final years of the war.Allied submarines sank an estimated 44 Japanese troopshipswith greater than 1,000 casualties in 33 of them.[55]The threat of submarine attack seriously hampered the ability of the Japanese Army to move troops.

Allied submarines also sank a number ofhell ships, which were transporting Allied POWs andrōmushaslave labourers. It is estimated that 10,800 POWs died at sea. Most of these deaths were the result of an Allied submarine attack.[56]Donald L. Miller has estimated the loss of life among POWs was twice that, asserting "approximately 21,000 Allied POWs died at sea, about 19,000 of them killed by friendly fire."[57]

Other duties[edit]Photograph of Makin Island taken from USSNautilusduring the raid on the island in August 1942.

Allied submarines served in a range of other duties during the Pacific War. U.S. Navy submarines were often used for surveillance. This included taking photos of areas of interest (such as potential beaches foramphibious landings), and reporting on the movements of IJN warships. U.S. submarines landed and suppliedreconnaissance and guerrilla forcesand played a role in sustaining the guerrilla movement in the Philippines,[58]at the cost of their diversion from attacks on Japanese commerce.[59]

In late 1944 and 1945 several submarines were fitted with a newly developed FM (frequency modulated) sonar that was intended for detection of submerged mines, firstTinosaandSpadefish, and laterFlying Fish,Skate,Bonefish,Crevalle, andSea Dog.Tinosasurveyed and mapped the minefields around Okinawa prior to the US invasion, and the boats of Operation Barney used the sonar to map and penetrate the minefields of Tsushima Strait prior to operating inside the Sea of Japan.

They also occasionally transportedcommandos, such asNautilusandArgonautlandingMarine Raidersfor anabortive raidonMakin Atoll.[60]

From early 1944 U.S. submarines were also used to rescue the crews of aircraft which had been forced down over the ocean. By the end of the war, submarines had rescued 504 airmen (includingGeorge H. W. Bush, who later became the 41stPresident of the United States).[61]

British and Dutch submarines also landed and suppliedspecial forcestroops, rescued airmen, and shelled shore installations on nine occasions.[62]

Britain also deployed a flotilla ofmidget submarinesto the Far East which were used to conduct sabotage raids. The Fourteenth Flotilla, which was equipped with sixXE-class submarines, arrived in Australia in April 1945 but was almost disbanded in May as no suitable targets could be found. The Flotilla's fortunes improved in early June, however, when undersea telegraph lines in the South China Sea were identified as being worthwhile targets along with aheavy cruiserat Singapore.[63]On 31 July,XE4cut the submerged Singapore-Saigon telegraph cable near Cape St. Jacques inFrench IndochinaandXE5cut the Hong Kong-Saigon cable close toLamma Island,Hong Kong.[64]At the same time,XE1andXE3penetrated theStraits of Johorwhere they severely damaged the Japanese heavy cruiserTakaowithlimpet mines.[65]

Submarine captain Medal of Honor awards[edit]
    Harder•Samuel D. Dealey
  • Sculpin•John P. Cromwell
  • Barb•Eugene B. Fluckey
  • Parche•Lawson P. Ramage
  • Tang•Richard O'Kane
  • Growler•Howard W. Gilmore
  • Tirante•George L. Street
Post-war[edit]

Allied actions in the Pacific are believed to have been a mitigating factor in reducing the sentence ofGroßadmiralKarl Dönitzfollowing theNuremberg Trials, who was accused of similar actions in theBattle of the Atlantic; indeed, AdmiralNimitzprovided Dönitz with a statement saying his boats behaved no differently.[66]The official judgment of theInternational Military Tribunalcited the statement as part of the reason Dönitz's sentence was "not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare."[67]

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